Nearly a decade after the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal 2015, Nepal’s federal system continues to generate debate. Federalism was introduced with the expectation that decentralization would strengthen governance, bring the state closer to citizens, and address longstanding grievances regarding representation and development. Yet the operational experience of the past years suggests that the country is still struggling to translate constitutional design into effective governance.
The problem may not lie in the principle of decentralization itself. Rather, it lies in the structural complexity and administrative fragmentation created by Nepal’s current seven-province model. As policymakers and analysts evaluate the long-term sustainability of federalism, an alternative idea is quietly gaining attention: replacing the seven provinces with five geographically coherent regions designed primarily around economic corridors and administrative efficiency.
Such a discussion should not be interpreted as a rejection of federalism. Instead, it reflects an attempt to refine Nepal’s governance architecture so that decentralization works in practice rather than merely in theory.
The Origins of the Seven-Province Model
Nepal’s federal structure emerged in the aftermath of the Nepalese Peace Process with the Constituent Assembly election and during the broader constitutional transition that reshaped the state. The debate for the creation of seven provinces was largely the result of political negotiation and compromise among competing parties and identity-based demands.
While the intention was to balance representation and stability, the resulting provincial boundaries were not always aligned with economic geography, administrative capacity, or historical governance patterns. As a consequence, several provinces face structural constraints that limit their ability to function as viable units of governance.
Fiscal dependence on the federal government remains high, institutional capacity at the provincial level remains uneven, and overlapping authority among federal, provincial, and local governments often produces administrative confusion. Instead of streamlining governance, the system has sometimes added additional layers of bureaucracy and with it corruption.
Lessons from International Experience
Around the world, federal or decentralized systems function best when subnational units possess both economic viability and administrative coherence. In the United States, individual states command large economic bases and long-standing institutional structures. The federal system in Germany similarly reflects historically established regional units with strong administrative capacity.
From a strategic perspective, Nepal must also consider its geopolitical environment. Situated between India and China, the country’s development increasingly depends on cross-border connectivity, energy trade, and economic corridors. Larger regional units could more effectively coordinate infrastructure and investment linked to these opportunities.
In contrast, smaller countries often adopt regional administrative systems that combine decentralization with national cohesion. Countries such as Japan and South Korea maintain strong centralized states while organizing development planning through geographically coherent regions and provinces. These systems emphasize efficiency and economic integration rather than political fragmentation.
Nepal’s governance challenge may therefore require a model that retains decentralization but simplifies the institutional structure.
A Regional Comparison: The Bangladesh Example
A useful comparative perspective for Nepal lies in the governance architecture of Bangladesh. Despite a population of roughly 171 million—nearly six times that of Nepal—Bangladesh has historically operated with a relatively streamlined political structure. Its national parliament, the Jatiya Sangsad, consists of 350 members: 300 directly elected and 50 seats reserved for women. The reforms now will reshape the parliamentary structure by replacing the purely unicameral system with a bicameral one, establishing a 100-member upper chamber known as the Legislative Council making it 450 legislators.
Nepal, by contrast, functions under a federal system with a bicameral Federal Parliament, similar to the Bangladesh’s new model—comprising the House of Representatives of Nepal and the National Assembly of Nepal—alongside seven provincial assemblies. When these layers are combined, Nepal’s total number of elected representatives across federal and provincial levels reaches roughly 850.
The comparison is striking. Bangladesh governs a population several times larger than Nepal’s with a national legislature that is significantly smaller than Nepal’s overall political representation structure. Geographically, Bangladesh is also slightly larger in land area than Nepal, yet it will maintain a largely centralized political system. This does not imply that Bangladesh’s governance model is without shortcomings. Like many centralized states, it faces challenges relating to political competition, democratic accountability, and institutional checks. Nevertheless, the comparison underscores an important structural principle: effective governance does not necessarily require a large or highly layered federal architecture.
Bangladesh’s experience illustrates how a state, combined with strong administrative decentralization, can manage governance even in large and densely populated societies. Local governments deliver services and manage development programs, while national institutions maintain coherence in economic policy, infrastructure planning, and national security.
For Nepal, the implication is not that the Bangladeshi system should be replicated wholesale. The two countries differ significantly in history, political evolution, and social composition. However, the comparison raises a legitimate question of proportionality in governance structures. If a country of more than 170 million people can function with roughly 450 national legislators, it is reasonable to ask whether a country with less than one-fifth of that population requires a multi-layered political architecture with hundreds more elected officials and seven provincial governments.
The core issue is not merely numerical; it concerns efficiency, fiscal sustainability, and clarity of authority. Maintaining multiple provincial bureaucracies, assemblies, and ministerial structures imposes a considerable financial burden on a developing state whose primary priority should be economic growth and institutional capacity. A streamlined administrative structure—such as a smaller number of regional administrative units operating within a strong national framework—could potentially achieve decentralization while avoiding the administrative fragmentation that currently characterizes Nepal’s governance system.
In strategic terms, governance structures should reflect scale, geography, and economic capability. Nepal’s federal experiment remains relatively young, but international comparisons increasingly suggest that simpler institutional architectures often provide clearer lines of authority and greater administrative efficiency. The lesson from Bangladesh, therefore, is not about copying its system, but about recognizing a broader governance principle: the effectiveness of a state depends less on the number of political institutions it creates and more on the strength and coherence of the institutions that already exist.
Constitutional Reforms and Institutional Balancing
Recent constitutional developments in Bangladesh further illustrate how institutional reform can be used to balance governance efficiency with democratic safeguards. A national referendum endorsed several structural reforms designed to strengthen democratic resilience and prevent future concentration of power.
One major reform introduced a two-term limit for the office of the prime minister, a measure intended to curb executive dominance and encourage leadership rotation. The reforms also transformed the parliamentary structure from a purely unicameral system into a bicameral arrangement through the creation of a 100-member upper chamber, the Legislative Council. The new chamber functions primarily as a constitutional and institutional safeguard check on the Lower House (Jatiya Sangsad) rather than as a parallel legislative body.
Its powers are outlined in the “July Charter” that include Constitutional Amendments: The Upper House’s assent is now mandatory for any changes to the Constitution. Second, Legislative Review: While it cannot initiate new laws or veto general legislation, it can review and return bills (except money bills) to the Lower House with suggested amendments for reconsideration. Third, International Treaties: Its approval is required for the ratification of international treaties and lastly, Appointment Oversight: Members of the Upper House will serve on the National Constitutional Council (NCC), which oversees key appointments to the judiciary and the Election Commission.
The other three major sets of reforms include to prevent future authoritarian rule. Judicial Independence for strengthening the independence of the judiciary and other constitutional bodies. Women’s Representation as measures to increase the representation of women in politics and parliament. And, Interim Government that will formalize a neutral caretaker government system for future election periods.
Taken together, these reforms reflect a broader institutional logic: governance systems can remain structurally lean while still incorporating robust mechanisms of accountability and oversight. For countries like Nepal, the lesson is clear—constitutional design must balance representation, efficiency, and institutional credibility if democratic governance is to remain both effective and sustainable.
The Case for Five Geographic Regions
A five-region framework would organize Nepal around major geographic and economic zones rather than the current politically negotiated provincial boundaries. The regions could broadly reflect the country’s natural economic corridors and development patterns: Far Western, Mid-Western, Western, Central, and Eastern.
Such an arrangement would mirror earlier administrative divisions that existed before federal restructuring, when Nepal operated through development regions designed for planning and coordination.
Each region would encompass a larger economic and demographic base than most of the current provinces. This would enhance fiscal capacity, strengthen administrative institutions, and enable more coherent regional planning.
The Far Western region, for example, could integrate the development priorities of the country’s most remote districts while leveraging hydropower potential and cross-border trade with India. The Western region centered around Pokhara could consolidate Nepal’s tourism economy and mountain infrastructure development.
The Central region would naturally function as the national administrative and financial hub, given the concentration of state institutions in the Kathmandu Valley. Meanwhile, the Eastern region—anchored in the Koshi basin and eastern Terai—could serve as an industrial and agricultural growth corridor with strong trade connectivity.
In essence, the five-region model would align governance structures with economic geography rather than political compromise.
Administrative Efficiency and Fiscal Sustainability
One of the most pressing criticisms of the current system concerns the cost and complexity of maintaining multiple layers of government. Provincial assemblies, ministries, and bureaucracies require significant financial resources. Yet many provinces remain heavily dependent on fiscal transfers from the federal government.
A five-region model could reduce administrative fragmentation while preserving decentralization. Larger regional units would possess stronger revenue bases and more coherent development planning capacity. They would also reduce duplication of institutions that currently exist across seven provincial governments.
Local governments—municipalities and rural municipalities—would remain the primary institutions for service delivery, ensuring that decentralization continues at the grassroots level.
Strategic Governance Implications
Beyond administrative efficiency, restructuring Nepal’s provincial system could also strengthen national cohesion. One of the persistent concerns during the federalization process was the risk of identity-based fragmentation. While inclusion and representation remain essential democratic principles, governance structures must also reinforce national unity.
Regions organized primarily around geography and economic planning are less likely to become arenas for ethnic or identity-based political competition. Instead, they can function as platforms for regional development and infrastructure coordination.
Nepal’s debate, therefore, should not be about preserving structures created in a moment of transition, but about building a governance system capable of delivering stability, development, and national cohesion. In the end, the true test of any political system is simple: not how it was negotiated, but whether it works for the nation it is meant to serve.
From a strategic perspective, Nepal must also consider its geopolitical environment. Situated between India and China, the country’s development increasingly depends on cross-border connectivity, energy trade, and economic corridors. Larger regional units could more effectively coordinate infrastructure and investment linked to these opportunities.
Reform Through Evolution, Not Disruption
Any discussion about restructuring Nepal’s federal system must proceed cautiously. Constitutional arrangements represent political consensus, and abrupt changes could generate new tensions. The objective should therefore not be to dismantle federalism but to refine and rationalize it over time.
A gradual transition toward a five-region model—combined with stronger fiscal federalism and clearer distribution of powers—could improve governance without undermining democratic decentralization.
Nepal’s political history demonstrates that institutional reforms succeed when they evolve through pragmatic adjustment rather than abrupt transformation. The country has repeatedly adapted its governance structures in response to changing realities.
Strategic Conclusion
The federal experiment in Nepal remains relatively young, and its ultimate success will depend not on defending the current structure but on honestly assessing whether it serves the nation’s long-term interests.
Many of the challenges it faces are typical of systems undergoing institutional transition. However, the experience of the past decade also provides valuable lessons about what works and what does not.
Governance systems must evolve with experience, evidence, and the realities of geography, economy, and administrative capacity. Around the world—from the decentralized yet unitary system of Bangladesh to the federal models of Germany and The United States—the lesson is consistent: institutions endure when they are designed for efficiency and legitimacy, not merely political compromise.
If federalism is to achieve its original objectives—better governance, balanced development, and stronger national unity—Nepal may eventually need to reconsider the scale and structure of its provincial architecture.
A five-region framework rooted in geography, economic integration, and administrative efficiency offers one possible pathway. Whether or not such a model is adopted, the broader lesson is clear: successful governance systems must reflect the realities of a nation’s geography, economy, and political culture.
Nepal’s debate, therefore, should not be about preserving structures created in a moment of transition, but about building a governance system capable of delivering stability, development, and national cohesion. In the end, the true test of any political system is simple: not how it was negotiated, but whether it works for the nation it is meant to serve.
(Basnyat is a Maj. General (retired) of the Nepali Army and a strategic affairs analyst. He is also a researcher and is affiliated with Rangsit University in Thailand)
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