Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chen Song is completing his three-year term. He paid a farewell visit to the current Prime Minister, Sushila Karki, on December 17. In a story published in one of Nepal’s leading newspapers about this meeting, Ambassador Song’s concerns during the meeting with the Prime Minister are interesting.
For instance, “Ambassador Chen requested that China and Chinese entities not be implicated in the Pokhara airport; CAMC Engineering Company is a state-owned organization and cannot be involved in corruption under Chinese law.” It was also quoted in the same news report that “the ambassador was recalled prematurely.”
The issues raised by the ambassador of a powerful country like China with the Prime Minister have great significance. In the context of Nepal, until a few decades ago, it was often discussed that China practiced “silent diplomacy.” If we leave aside the historical period of war between China and Nepal and the period when Nepal used to receive annual tribute from Tibet, China developed a good rapport with Nepal throughout the 45-year Cold War.
China’s strategic relations with Nepal developed steadily; China provided significant economic assistance (roads, infrastructure) to Nepal, and Nepal supported China’s “One China Policy.” Both countries signed several treaties, such as the 1960 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Border Agreement.
Today, Nepal and China are good friends. In 2012, when China was moving forward under the “strong hand” of Xi Jinping, Nepal was preparing to promulgate a constitution through the Constituent Assembly to address the diverse voices of the Nepali people. In 2015, when Nepal was declaring its constitution, China, a friendly country on the verge of becoming a world power, had already started spreading “Xi ideology” in its neighborhood and beyond.
Compared to some other countries, corruption in China may be relatively lower, and if corruption is proven, strict action may be taken under Chinese law.
UML leader KP Sharma Oli, who became the Prime Minister of Nepal after the promulgation of the Constitution, visited China. The Nepali side had understood that it would be just a courtesy call with President Xi, but the meeting, which was supposed to last an hour, stretched to more than 40 minutes. Some analyzed it as leftist proximity shown by Xi to UML leader and Prime Minister Oli. During that visit, agreements were made between the two countries to build Pokhara International Airport and other physical infrastructure.
In this article, I have discussed the unprecedented activity of Chinese diplomats in Nepal in recent years and the serious concerns expressed by the ambassador over Chinese companies.
Nepal and China formally established diplomatic relations on August 1, 1955. After the economic assistance agreement in 1956, China opened an embassy in Kathmandu in 1960, and Nepal established an embassy in Beijing in 1961. The current ambassador is the 22nd ambassador to Nepal. An ambassador, as a diplomat, is expected to represent his country in the host nation, maintain good relations between the two countries, and, if necessary, negotiate diplomatic treaties.
Hou Yanqi, who came to Nepal as the 21st ambassador, demonstrated activities beyond standard diplomatic practice during her four-year tenure. Yanqi, who arrived in Nepal in 2018, proved the perception of China’s “silent diplomacy” wrong.
Author Baburam Bishwakarma, in his book “Bhurajniti Ko Bhar”, has written a chapter titled “Hou Yanqi: Less Diplomacy, More Politics” on her tenure. Bishwakarma depicts how she facilitated the then CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist Centre in adopting a common manifesto and common candidates in the 2017 elections, and how a school on Xi ideology, run under a plan of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, operated within the Nepal Communist Party, in which Yanqi played a special role. She also wrote a threatening letter to an editor-in-chief who published a critical story about China.
Overall, throughout her tenure, she remained active in managing internal politics, uniting the UML and Maoists, resolving disputes that arose after unification, and openly publicizing China’s work in Nepal. Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal took place during Yanqi’s tenure. It is a normal course for successors to take responsibility for carrying forward the communist-friendly legacy she left in Nepal.
Writer Sudheer Sharma, in his book “The Storm Across the Himalayas: Nepal’s Tangled Relationship with China”, concludes Yanqi’s tenure by depicting her efforts as embodying China’s political micromanagement in Nepal.
There is also a coincidence between Ambassador Chen Song and Pokhara International Airport. He came to Nepal in January 2023, and the airport was inaugurated in the same month. During the first international flight, Pokhara Airport was repeatedly claimed to be a signature project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The airport was presented as a symbol of China–Nepal friendship and the success of the BRI, and the Chinese government’s support, design, and construction were portrayed as a glorious narrative.
The government led by then Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli signed the BRI Implementation Framework Agreement with the active support of then Foreign Minister Arju Rana Deuba and Congress General Secretary Gagan Thapa. However, it is still not clear whether Pokhara International Airport is actually an integral part of the BRI or not. More interestingly, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Tianjin last August, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement claiming that Nepal had expressed support for the Global Security Initiative (GSI).
There is a claim that “CAMC Engineering Company is a state-owned organization and cannot engage in corruption.” The theoretical aspect of this statement may be considered correct. However, it would not be fair to dismiss the irregularities highlighted by investigative reports in Nepali media and the study report submitted by the subcommittee formed under the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament.
As mentioned in the charge sheet filed by the concerned authority of Nepal, “the technical design stipulated that gravel and soil should be brought from a distance of five kilometers to fill the airport. To increase the height of the airport, China CAMC used gravel and soil from the construction site itself, saving transportation costs amounting to USD 8 million. It is alleged that the company completed the contract work at a lower cost and that the amount saved in this way was taken illegally without being clearly reflected in accounting and technical reports.”
Whether or not the involvement of a Chinese construction company in corruption at Pokhara Airport is confirmed by the court is a judicial matter. However, prima facie, it has been demonstrated that corruption can occur in Chinese projects as well.
Similarly, China Railway Engineering Group Co. Ltd., which was awarded the contract to upgrade the Kamala–Kanchanpur road section under the East–West Highway, has also been accused of illegally mining the Khutti Khola and its tributaries in Siraha, a region designated as protected by the Nepal government. Last year, in a writ filed against China Railway, the Supreme Court issued a show-cause order to the respondents.
Compared to some other countries, corruption in China may be relatively lower, and if corruption is proven, strict action may be taken under Chinese law. However, it cannot be claimed that a company cannot engage in corruption simply because it is Chinese and government-owned. As China has expanded its ambitious BRI globally, the impact of irregularities has also increased.
In this context, Luke Patey’s book “How China Loses” notes: “At the 2019 Belt and Road Forum, Xi said there was zero tolerance for corruption in the initiative. Beginning in 2013, Xi’s widespread anti-corruption campaign in China sought to root out graft, leading to the detention of party leaders, executives, and low-level officials alike.
But Xi’s drive to root out corruption is limited by its dual purpose of targeting his political opponents. China’s corruption is now following its activities overseas and can upset its geostrategic goals in the process” (p. 119). Similarly, China continues to rank poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
Last but not least, the manner in which the Chinese ambassador is “accomplishing his tenure” at a time when a crucial election for Falgun 21 has been announced—and when Nepal’s political landscape remains uncertain due to the Gen-Z movement—may be a subject of intriguing investigation for those interested in China’s concerns in Nepal.
Whether or not the involvement of a Chinese construction company in corruption at Pokhara Airport is confirmed by the court is a judicial matter. However, prima facie, it has been demonstrated that corruption can occur in Chinese projects as well.
(Views expressed in this opinion are the writer’s and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Khabarhub — Editor)
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