Infrastructure Cooperation a Leverage of Soft Power and a Challenge

China and the US rivalry has enhanced competition in infrastructure cooperation with a global vision in three conducts challenging and at the same time complementing the prevailing ones; one nation led, multi nations led cooperation and UN initiated.

Uni-nation which is led by China for Global Community Shared Future (GCSF) and the other in multi-nations led by the US as Build Back Better World (B3W).

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), one of the five regional hub promoting cooperation among countries to achieve inclusive and sustainable development has been involved to address infrastructure connectivity gap in South Asia and Southeast Asia.

There are two categories in global connectivity cooperation. Intergovernmental institutions have collaboration for regional connectivity and in South Asia, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and other developmental policies orchestrated by regional powers China and India.

Minilateral efforts within the regional framework like Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal Motor Vehicle Agreement (BBIN MVA).

The corridor connects the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf via Iran, then to St. Petersburg and North European via Russian Federation.

Partnership for cooperation comes in different forms bilateral cooperation, mini-lateral collaboration, multilateral schemes and global initiatives.

Infrastructure development needs have been catered, been planned and supported by international institutions the UN, intergovernmental organisations and international financial institutions the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.

Infrastructure cooperation plays a crucial role in international relations as it fosters economic development, strengthens diplomatic ties, and promotes links within and cross-border connectivity.

With the competition also comes opportunities for developing nations but geopolitics also needs consideration. The approach should accommodate national and regional strategic development projection.

South Asia is least connected however trailing Southeast Asia as the fastest growing regions. China and India’s competition and the rivalry of China and the US has given precedence to infrastructure cooperation as a viability for political influence, an economic opening as a soft power tool.

When it is a necessity for developing nations, it is political options as well as a monetary revenue for the supporting country and international financial institutions. Geopolitics of trip over into the strategic trap contrasts with national necessity for economic growth.

Global visions (B3W + GSCF)

President Xi Jingping first raised the idea to “promote a sense of community of shared future for mankind” at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012. Xi put forward the vision of GCSF while addressing the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 2013. An initiative that concerns the future of humanity and the destiny of every human being.

It lays out five-point proposals in the areas of partnerships, security environment, development, inter-civilization exchanges, and ecosystem.

The five -point goals is to pursue openness, inclusiveness, mutual benefit, equity and justice.

This charts the path and has opened up new prospects for international exchanges in addition offers action plans through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilisational Initiative (GCI).

GDI is building on to 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for stronger, greener and healthier global development.

It is a multilateral development initiative proposed at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by Xi in 2021.

The group of friends as of September 2022 is more than 100 countries and international organisations with six core principles and eight priority areas.

GSI was proposed during the annual Boao Forum on 21 April 2022 indicating indivisible security in the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) to “uphold the principle of indivisibility of security, build a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture, and oppose the building of national security on the basis of insecurity in other countries”.

The security of each state in the IPR is inextricably linked to the security of every other state and China.

In March 2022 Zhang Jun, China’s permanent representative at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) said that the world needs dialogue and cooperation, and does not need a new Cold War.

“Differences between countries in national interests, social systems and ideologies should not become obstacles to dialogue, nor should they become reasons for confrontation.”

GCI in March 2023 was recited with three substances respect for civilization diversity, flourishing people-to-people exchanges and exploring paths towards modernization.

Implementation of GCI is admiration to multiplicity of civilizations and valve the philosophical significance of own histories and cultures in the contemporary world.

This initiative stands as a response to concepts of trailing behind the estrangement, clash, or superiority of civilizations.

For a shared common future, five principles of peaceful coexistence was announced by Xi while marking the 70^th anniversary on 28 June.

In June 2021, the Group of Seven (G7) unveiled the B3W initiative, which seeks to leverage the public and private sector for USD40 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2035.

Under the initiative lies four pillars: healthcare, gender equality and equity, climate and environment and digital technology.

A multi nation led global strategic outlook with different schemes like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

PGII was established by the G7 in 2022 with leaders and senior officials from Australia, Comoros, Cook Islands, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Republic of Korea (ROK), and the World Bank. Private sectors executives from Citi, Global Infrastructure Partners, Japan Foreign Council and Nokia were present.

IMEC in the other hand was signed by 10 countries during the 2023 Group of Twenty (G20) connecting South Asia through the Persian Gulf to Europe.

Signed by 32 countries and funded by G77 Gold Standards, larger advanced Asian and international agencies such as Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

These are openings and commitments for unlocking public and private capital for the projects in the developing world.

The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) established in 2000 and ratifies in 12 Sept 2002 by India, Iran and Russia is a 7,200-km long multi-model transportation network of ship, rail, and road route for moving freight between Azerbaijan, India, Iran, Russia, Central Asia and Europe.

The corridor connects the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf via Iran, then to St. Petersburg and North European via Russian Federation.

The north end is Moscow with the South end in Mumbai in addition offers an alternative to the traditional Suez Canal route, with potential to reduce transit times by 40 percent and freight costs by 30 percent.

India together with Pakistan was also granted full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) following suite in July 2017. Iran joined in 2023.

The September 2019 proposed 10,300 kilometres Chennai-Vladivostok ‘Eastern Maritime Corridor’ (EMC) during the Eastern Economic Forum connecting Russia’s Far East and South-eastern India has emerged with tensions in West Asia creating logistical nightmare for global trade and saves 5,608 km or 40 percent time reducing logistics cost compared to the Suez route as Russia-India-South Asia Red Sea alternative.

The Suez Canal, a human made waterway is one of the world’s most heavily used shipping lanes, carrying over 12 percent of world trade by volume. It is situated in north-eastern Egypt, spanning across the Isthmus of Suez.

The canal connects Port Said on the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Egyptian city of Suez on the Red Sea. It extends approximately 193 kilometres (120 miles) from the city of Port Said in the north to the city of Suez in the south. The canal separates the African continent from the Sinai Peninsula.

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) or also known as the Northeast Passage (NEP) can be a game changer or even a road to hegemony.

The NSR route, which is 13,000 kilometres could be an alternative between Europe and Asia from the Suez Canal route, which is 21,000 kilometres connecting the eastern and western parts of the Artic Ocean.

China and Russia’s attempts to explore an alternative trade route by financing the NSR could open a new theatre of contestation. This reduces to and fro sailing time from one month to less than two weeks from Europe to Asia.

Global vision Irritants / constraints

China, India, Russia and the US through regional and sub-regional intergovernmental organisations like G7, G20, Group of 77 (G77) and China, Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) and SCO have been involved in influencing the new world order.

Economy, security and technology has implications through North-South and South-South cooperation to attain the global visions.

17 nations signed Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) and 13 member and one observer in INSTC, both connectivity for economic pledge came up in May 2017 and Sept 2000 respectively.

Global vision irritant is also the handling mindset weather democratic capitalist or communist capitalist that is at play in Ukraine, Gaza, Red Sea, and potential hot spots.

These corridors have linkages with the Asian Highway (AH) or also known as or Great Asian Highway among countries in Asia and the UNESCAP.

Signed by 32 countries and funded by G77 Gold Standards, larger advanced Asian and international agencies such as Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Second, are the irritants for GSCF with the events at the South China Sea (SCS), economy of Taiwan, resources of Tibet, terrorism, global responsibilities, global supply chain and the group of friends of diverse Chinese initiatives.

Third is the US led democracies for supporting Ukraine against Russia, the Middle East war in Gaza and diplomatic stance at the SCS and Taiwan Strait.

The Red Sea, a critical conduit for 30 percent of the world’s container traffic is in crisis of unpredictable scale adding another challenge for international security in global supply chain.

Fourth, Turkey, Iran and Egypt criticised the prospects of the project of IMEC undermining the strategic significance of the Bosporus Strait, Chabahar Port and Suez Canal respectively.

However, another parallel sea and land route, originating from India’s Mundra to Israel’s Haifa, has emerged as that bypass the on edge Red Sea. The big question is whether it will nourish the IMEC or deter with the end of the war in Gaza.

Fifth, is the conditions for funding the infrastructure projects, if it is in grant, soft loan, concessional loans, or country specific loan with high interests.

India’s policies from ‘First Neighbourhood’, ‘Act East’, ‘Act Far East’ ‘Connect Central Asia’ ‘Think West’ and ‘Security and Growth of All in the Region (SAGAR)’ has direct relevance with global and minilateral initiatives. Besides the Chinese global engagements India is also together with Russia and Iran in the INSTC and with Japan in AAGC.

As Xi and President Putin convened in Astana, Kazakhstan during the SCO to deepen cooperation, Prime Minister Modi is skipping the summit but met Putin in Moscow on 8-9 July as a first trip to the country since it invaded Ukraine and as the third time PM in addition discontent in replacing Dollar with Yuan signaling a play down the significance of the summit amid New Delhi’s efforts to strike a delicate balance in its foreign policy. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit is also being held in Washington on 9 July.

China is a key partner in Bangladesh’s infrastructure and economic development and the visit would seek assistance in investment, trade, financial aid and the repatriation of Rohingyas, while continuing to support China in the global arena.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) also known as the Iran nuclear deal was signed by Iran with the five members of the UNSC, Germany together with the European Union (EU) in July 2015. This eased the prospects of INSTC.

On the other hand, the US departure from JCPOA in 2018, trailed by imposition of severer sanctions on Iran created new confronts, prompting substantial delays in infrastructure projects related to INSTC.

China, Iran, North Korea and Russia are in the forming strategic partnership together stretching the western resources from Europe to Asia via Persian Gulf.

Global vision irritant is also the handling mindset weather democratic capitalist or communist capitalist that is at play in Ukraine, Gaza, Red Sea, and potential hot spots.

In addition, the outcome of NATO, SCO, Modi-Putin meeting. Modi has been just nominated as the Head of Government with coalition partners, Xi and Putin has been the driving factor against the West as well as the outcome of the coming up US election will display the prospects of global visions.

Infrastructure in South Asia

China shares borders with all South Asian overland countries except Bangladesh, while Sri Lanka and the Maldives are island states in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Five (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) of eight countries of South Asia have extended their support to BRI.

China’s infrastructure investments in South Asia are not solely driven by economic considerations but also serve broader geopolitical objectives fueling geopolitical tensions particularly to India and democracies.

Four overland projects, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Trans Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network (THMDCN) and China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor and a maritime silk road with construction of ports and other strategic assets, China aims to enhance its influence and counter the strategic dominance challenging the traditional dominance of India and the West particularly the US and Allies.

Despite its opposition to BRI, India is the largest loan taker from the China-led AIIB in addition India has strengthened its strategic ties with Australia, Japan and the US, forming Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) strategic security partnerships aimed at promoting connectivity and economic development in the region while countering China’s influence. India is more engaged bilaterally and with minilateral schemes.

Second is to ensure that Russia is not China’s corner and also openly support India and maintains enduring neutrality in the China-India territorial disputes.

This has led to growing apprehensions among South Asian countries and other stakeholders about the implications of China’s rise for regional security dynamics and sought to diversify their partnerships and balance their relationships between China, India and the US and Allies.

PM Hasina of Bangladesh fifth visit to China and her first since securing a fourth consecutive term in office is a point of case for enhancing strategic relations.

India will closely monitor what the elevation bilateral relations to a “new level” means for its own strategic interests.

China is a key partner in Bangladesh’s infrastructure and economic development and the visit would seek assistance in investment, trade, financial aid and the repatriation of Rohingyas, while continuing to support China in the global arena.

Conclusion

While the world is witnessing 32 nations NATO summit in Washington DC on the 75^th anniversary summit for a stronger NATO to respond to challenges today and for the long term via reinforcing support to Ukraine with also a focus to work hand in hand in the IPR.

Modi’s visit to Russia skipping the SCO summit and Xi and Putin reassurance in the unlimited relationship during the SCO.

All occurring in the first half of July. Xi called on to “consolidate the power of unity” in the face of “real challenge and interference and divisions”.

CCTV quoted as XI saying He said “We should work together to resist external interference … and firmly grasp our own future and destiny, as well as regional peace and development, in our own hands.”

Modi’s absence in the 24^th SCO summit but a first visit to meet Putin stresses the fact to reaffirm the longstanding ties between the two countries, which date back to the Cold War.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs said that the two leaders would “review the entire range of multifaceted relations between the two countries and exchange views on contemporary regional and global issues of mutual interest”.

Russia remains one of India’s most important trading partners, particularly on weapons and defence.

In addition, “Secure” Security, Economy and Trade, Connectivity, Unity, Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Environment.

The discourse, narratives, policies and rhetoric on external events like Global Visions and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology and bilateral relations must be justifiably recognised.

The focus will be on these core principles emphasising of the theme of the 23^rd SCO summit held in Delhi in July 2023 “Secure SCO”.

It also helps to dispel two diplomatic perceptions one is that New Delhi is getting too close to the West and further away from Moscow, ceding space to China.

Second is to ensure that Russia is not China’s corner and also openly support India and maintains enduring neutrality in the China-India territorial disputes.

Comparable cases of peaceful rise of democratic and autocratic mindset in achieving global vision is underway through use of soft power.

An official policy and political slogan of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ or referred as ‘peaceful development’ is standing with the international community that China’s growing political, economic and military power would not pose a threat to internal peace and security.

As a responsible world leader China’s emphasis in soft power.

China has sought to be a non-threatening world power rebutting “China threat theory” as more a narrative.

China today stands firm with a political slogan as a “Positional Peaceful Rise”. It is countering the challenges posed by the US and allies simultaneously partnering with other developing nations bilaterally, with group of friends supporting the Global Visions.

India’s engagement and relations is the other hand is important to both the competitors China and the US so is to China, Iran and Russia.

In the Global visions, India views INSTC, EMC, NSR an opportunity with the China, Iran, Russia and the Central Asia, a region rich in hydrocarbons together with being part of the follow up initiatives of the B3W as a key geopolitical significance.

India is also a member of BRICS, SCO active intergovernmental organisations competing the West in addition actively involved in G20 and an invitee of G7. ‘All Alignment’ and ‘Balancing’ in the foreign policy amongst the rivals with North-South cooperation as a determination of stability and prosperity to all.

Furthermore, the US and its allies have also stepped up their engagement in South Asia as part of their broader Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Through initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network and B3W initiative, they aim to provide alternative sources of financing for infrastructure development while promoting transparency, sustainability, and good governance standards.

For smaller countries and Nepal falling into the entrapment of Global Visions B3W and GCSF must be watched at the same time taking it as an opening to an advantage of the economic and social successes with bilateralism and minilateralism.

The constraints and irritants in achieving the political, security and economic is complex with the ongoing global diplomatic manoeuvring by notable powers.

The discourse, narratives, policies and rhetoric on external events like Global Visions and actors, military and security issues, economy and technology and bilateral relations must be justifiably recognised.

Neutrality, consensus and a “Country of Peace” are even more crucial given the Sino-US rivalry and Sino-India competition.

(The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand)