Large neighbors next door and democratization in Nepal

Nepal’s geo-political strategic environment remains of crucial significance for its neighbors – India and China in the Central Himalayan region. The preponderant impact that disparity in size has brought to this country is a common staple in political analysis. This held as much in the past as it does now or will do in the future. What is less observed is a comparative analysis in a cross-country framework of empirical value that could bring forth genuine academic discourse of theoretical value, rather than tag along the conventional course of historical narrative.

This article certainly does not intend to venture forth into the depth of such deliberations. The information here is simpler: Attempting a crude sketch of how the presence of a large neighbor has left its political impact on the dynamics of democratization of a state still muddling its way through transition.

Nepal offers a classic specimen for testing this hypothesis. The salient impact of neighborhood is evident here in two critical and sequentially cumulative ways: size and frequency.

States are more likely to be influenced by their very large neighbors, says the Democratic Diffusion Hypothesis. Hypothetically, if a non-democratic state ‘A’ has a very long border with a democratic neighbor ‘B’, then the probability of state ‘A’  making political transition to some level of democracy will remain high. But if neighbor states are all democratic or partly democratic, it will be very difficult to maintain a non-democratic regime.

Nepal offers a classic specimen for testing this hypothesis. The salient impact of neighborhood is evident here in two critical and sequentially cumulative ways: size and frequency.

Geopolitically, Nepal’s non-democratic feudal monarchy lay next door to two megastates—India and China. But neighborhood impact operated here in a relatively proportionate manner, since India remained in a functional sense more adjacent for centuries at a time when Science and Technology, particularly Information Technology (IT) and cyberware were not mass phenomena along with the physical barrier of the Himalayas all along on one side to restrict the flow of population and contacts through modern forms of transport.

Could the political opening of two megastates in its contiguous neighborhood leave Nepal untouched for long and in a situation when there was no third state to intervene in any way?

This relatively stronger contiguity of Indian neighborhood explains the heavy influence India has had on Nepal which, moreover, functions in a multiple form—social, economic, cultural, and political, as also demographic. To say this, of course, is not to deny that the impact was or is unidirectional.

The geological barrier combined with the absence of Science and Technology including IT and cyberware and aviation explain thus the distinctly differential impact that India and China wielded on Nepal’s politics and foreign policy in both the mode and magnitude of the political impact momentum—India for decades through its independence movement and liberation from British imperial yoke in August 1947 and China earlier in 1911 from the Manchu monarchy and then in 1949 from a feudal party rule of the Kuomintang.

Could the political opening of two megastates in its contiguous neighborhood leave Nepal untouched for long and in a situation when there was no third state to intervene in any way?

Clearly, the Democratic Diffusion Hypothesis was at work. In just four years between 1947 and 1951, the traditional monarchy — in essence, a diarchy of two dynasties, the Shah and the Ranas –started crumbling after the Great Britain departed from India and ultimately collapsed in 1951. That was just two years after the October Revolution that brought a communist republic in China and Tibet whose penumbra of red political ideology was beginning to project its power in a virtual sense even after the umbra of British power faded into history.

South Asian Democratic Transitions

Although in the past few decades, many countries of South Asia have developed strong incentives for the political parties to cultivate democratic governance, the political dispensation has done little to reach out to the citizens and make even modest improvements in state-building and economic development.

A crucial factor that makes South Asia behave differently may be due to considerable powers granted to the central government which should be always responsible for smooth operation of the political system and have priority concern for protecting the regime’s legitimacy than meeting the citizens’ demands.

The top leaders at each level tend to assume exclusive powers which, in turn, leads to the abuse of power. Conversely, it is very unlikely that the central government may generate a relatively stable system whereby their social bases become more stable, loyal, and clearly defined to facilitate rapid progress of the democratization process.

The lack of political will is one critical factor that is responsible to adequately address the needs and aspirations of the people and bring about quality change in their lives. In order to comprehend the political development in South Asia, we must note that democratic institutions, including the parliament and political parties, are unable to promote the egalitarian concept of democracy; as a result, the citizens lose trust in the political parties and the legislature in spite of crucial political reforms such as direct elections and new openings in conformity with temporal but substantial stability in their ideology.

It is also necessary to note that political elites tend to attend to family and patronage demands at the political center stage. In some cases, widespread use of guns, goons, and gold has been found to secure political victory. Besides, they do not have significant tendency to adjust their policies, which creates a tension that may lead in dangerous directions.

While talking about postcolonial democracies of South Asia, we must not apply the same set of principles to assess the prevailing civil and political freedoms as some of them might have been legitimately sacrificed in the name of national unity and security at different times since the British withdrawal.

The quality of democracy also varies in terms of specific dimensions, e.g. people’s participation, freedom and equality, institutional control and competition, political responsiveness and accountability, and unqualified regard to the rule of law. In the light of citizens’ expectations, the politics of identity is a dominant feature and an indispensable factor, although there are incentives to build and protect the political system otherwise and strengthen its legitimacy.

There is, of course, little agreement over precise significance of democracy or a model of democracy or even on political preferences of the people to find points of unity for a fledgling global citizenship.

In some cases, insurmountable challenges to the social and political order may appear to combat fear and avoid disillusionment amongst the people. While Nepal was never a colony as such, it may face some uncertainties in light of the political culture characterized by the lack of opportunities for collective action.

This is largely because the cases of identity politics that draw a large number of participants are very likely to invite social movements all over in the world on the daily working of democracy; it could be a complex political issue. What is worth taking notice is that identity politics is flourishing in the name of representation, recognition, and reverence.

We must recognize the rhetoric which is taking deep roots in India, a troubling feature in all other countries of South Asia to a varying degree.  This is not only pulling apart modern democracy but also fuelling resentments among the multicultural population mainly abetted by demagogues; that is why we cannot expect much from the government in controlling the situation.

That brings us to the question to consider: how a modern democracy can meet all the challenges at once so that all individuals are treated as equals, their unique selves are respected as special, and their group claims receive due recognition through collectively-owned enterprises and individuals, especially by creating a liberal democratic society to hold different origins together. It will take a long time to establish an order to open up more democratic spaces.

At a time when democracy is proliferating geographically along with increasingly more transparency, accountability, and better performance than any time before, South Asia is yet to have profound reforms to foster the decentralized political structures, implement a decisive policy rapidly, and change the citizen’s political participation structurally to shape the individual behavior.

Professor Maya Chadda observes one of the most remarkable characteristics of South Asia is that the political arrangement is largely confined to the ‘elite bargain’, which often has a negative effect; for example, slow consolidation as in India and Nepal, or interruptive consolidation, as in Pakistan.

There is, of course, little agreement over precise significance of democracy or a model of democracy or even on political preferences of the people to find points of unity for a fledgling global citizenship.

Unsurprisingly, it is our argument that South Asia has been uniquely grappling with historical mistrust among its member countries, which is being constantly displayed in one after other examples of division, conflict, extremism, and terrorism.

This was, albeit pessimistically, foreseen by Samuel P Huntington in the 1960s when he warned that the citizens’ demands of ‘newly developing countries’ will rapidly escalate and generate high levels of government spending that would reduce the surplus available for investment, with a negative effect on economic growth.’

There is, of course, little agreement over precise significance of democracy or a model of democracy or even on political preferences of the people to find points of unity for a fledgling global citizenship.

The power asymmetry of India is a geographic reality and its economic and military status is beyond dispute. It is indeed the case that India is the longest running democracy in South Asia sharing boundaries with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka and this most important member in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is far superior to other members in economic, political, and military contexts.

The prospects of South Asian democratic integration depend essentially on its democratic politics. At the same time, a variety of militant insurgency movements in the region pose severe strains on governance and create a great sense of expectation about the potential capacities of the states creating democratic governance in practice.

The fundamental question is whether South Asian democracies are effective in creating modern national societies that could lay the way for directing a goal-oriented change at the level of the individual citizen. What this means is that where people believe only democratic rule is a good way of governing, their goal becomes effecting deep sustained social change in their societies. However, while many South Asian countries today are generally referred to as democracies, their foreign policy often fails to adequately reflect the domestic reality. (To be continued)