History tells us where Nepal–India relations came from. Geography tells us why they cannot be separated. Economics tells us why they must cooperate, and strategy tells us why the relationship must continually evolve. But history alone cannot determine the future.
For decades, one question has dominated the conversation on Nepal–India relations: What does India want from Nepal? That question remains relevant, but it may no longer be the most important one. A different question is increasingly emerging from Nepal, particularly among its younger generation: What can Nepal and India build together?
This is more than a change in wording. It reflects a fundamental generational and strategic shift in how Nepal increasingly views its relationship with India. Nepal and India have deep historical, cultural and civilisational ties. Geography makes the relationship unavoidable; history gives it depth; and people-to-people connections give it resilience. The younger generation is increasingly judging foreign relations by a more practical standard: What does this relationship deliver to an ordinary Nepali?
Does it create opportunities? Does it improve connectivity? Does it open markets? Does it attract investment and technology? Does it generate employment? Does it strengthen Nepal’s energy economy? Does it contribute to security and prosperity? And, equally importantly, does it allow Nepal to engage with India as a sovereign and confident partner?
Political uncertainty weakens governance. Weak governance erodes trust. Declining trust further weakens political legitimacy. This cycle must be broken.
The new phase of the relationship is characterised by a Nepal that is more politically assertive, more strategically conscious and increasingly determined to protect its sovereignty and policy autonomy. India, meanwhile, sees Nepal not only through the lens of historical ties but also through connectivity, energy security, border management and its wider strategic competition in the Himalayan and Indo-Pacific regions.
This creates both opportunities and tensions.
The relationship, defined largely by political sensitivities, traditional security perceptions and episodic diplomacy, is no longer sufficient. The future should be based on mutual strategic confidence rather than mutual strategic suspicion.
The economic relationship and military bonds provide a powerful foundation. India accounts for more than 60 per cent of Nepal’s external goods trade, while 32,000 Nepalis serve in the Indian Gurkha regiments. Meanwhile, cross-border railways, petroleum pipelines, transmission lines, integrated check posts and electricity trade are gradually creating a more interconnected economic space. However, recruitment has stalled following Nepal’s objection to India’s Agnipath scheme. Nepal’s clean energy, particularly hydropower, is emerging not merely as an export commodity but as a potential pillar of a broader Nepal–India energy partnership.
The strategic question, therefore, is not whether Nepal should be closer to India or farther away from it. It is how Nepal and India can build a relationship in which proximity does not become dependency and sovereignty does not become distance.
This is where Nepal–India relations stand at an important crossroads. This should be the central focus of Prime Minister Balen Shah’s visit.
From Transactional Trust to Strategic Confidence
The relationship has often operated through what might be described as volatile, transactional trust. It is volatile because confidence can rise and fall sharply around particular political or diplomatic events. It is transactional because there is often no sufficiently durable strategic baseline to which the relationship can naturally return. Every new political cycle can therefore reopen old questions.
This model is no longer adequate.
The future requires something more durable: strategic confidence. Strategic confidence does not mean that Nepal should distance itself from India in the name of nationalism or strategic equidistance. Nor does it mean that Nepal should become excessively dependent on India. It means creating enough confidence within Nepal to engage closely with India without fear of losing strategic autonomy.
This distinction is important. Nepal wants partnership without hierarchy, connectivity without political vulnerability and cooperation without excessive reliance. It wants a strategic partnership with India, but not a strategic alliance. That distinction should be clearly understood in New Delhi.
Nepal can cooperate extensively with India in energy, disaster management, cybersecurity, border management, defence education, technology, tourism and regional connectivity while retaining independent foreign-policy choices. Indeed, a confident Nepal should see India not as a constraint on its strategic autonomy but as an opportunity to expand its strategic space.
What Does Nepal Want from India?
The answer is therefore broader than investment, employment or connectivity, although all three are critically important. Nepal wants India to become a principal partner in helping transform its geography into an economic and strategic advantage. Nepal can become an energy hub, a digital bridge, a tourism gateway and a platform connecting South Asia with the Himalayas.
India has a natural comparative advantage in helping Nepal achieve this. Its enormous market, geographical proximity, infrastructure, technological capacity and economic weight give it capabilities that no other country can replicate in Nepal. Nepal could become part of India’s broader economic rise and growth, accompanied by stronger defence capabilities, more reliable intelligence systems, improved law and order, strategic development plans that avoid dependence and the creation of a conducive environment for effective climate diplomacy.
For Nepal, therefore, India should be the partner of first choice in areas where geography gives it a comparative advantage. But partnership must produce tangible outcomes.
Electricity exports can create a new economic relationship. Trilateral partnerships involving Nepal, China and India, or Nepal, Bangladesh and India, can open new avenues for diplomacy in disaster management and clean energy. Cross-border transmission infrastructure can turn energy into strategic interdependence. Better roads, railways and integrated checkpoints can connect Nepal more effectively to Indian and global markets. Digital connectivity can create new opportunities in services and technology. Tourism can be developed as a shared regional economic sector. Investment can generate employment rather than merely facilitate capital flows.
This is how the relationship can acquire legitimacy among a new generation. History gives the relationship its foundation. Outcomes give it legitimacy. A shared long-term vision gives it a future.
The Deeper Misunderstanding
Yet there remains a fundamental misunderstanding on both sides. For India, the first correction should be conceptual. Nepal–India relations are not relations between two administrations, political parties or bureaucracies. They are relations between two sovereign nations and, above all, between two peoples.
Governments change. Political equations shift. Bureaucracies rotate. But national interests, identities and societal relationships endure.
New Delhi therefore needs to engage with Nepal not merely as a neighbouring administration to be managed, but as a sovereign nation whose security, dignity, aspirations and strategic choices must be understood and respected. This does not mean that India should ignore its legitimate strategic interests. India has understandable concerns arising from its geography and the strategic environment surrounding the Himalayas. But strategic interests are best protected through trust, not perpetual suspicion.
A stable, prosperous and confident Nepal is ultimately more valuable to India than a Nepal that feels strategically constrained. India’s strategic objective should therefore not be to manage Nepal, but to help build a relationship in which a confident and prosperous Nepal sees India as its most trusted and consequential partner. That requires a shift from reactive diplomacy to ‘Century Diplomacy’. Century Diplomacy would ask a different question: not simply what India needs from Nepal today, but what kind of Nepal–India relationship both countries should build over the next century.
Such thinking would move the relationship beyond political cycles, individual disputes and episodic diplomacy towards enduring institutions, economic interdependence, connectivity, people-to-people relations and sovereign equality.
Nepal’s Own Misunderstanding
Nepal, however, also has a misunderstanding to overcome. It sometimes interprets strategic autonomy as strategic distance. That is a strategic miscalculation. Strategic autonomy is not about maintaining equal distance from every major power. It is about retaining the freedom to choose partnerships according to national interests. Nepal does not need to choose between China, India, the United States or other international partners as though its foreign policy were a zero-sum contest. Nor should Nepal allow itself to become an arena for great-power competition.
Its objective should be to enlarge its strategic space through diversified relationships while maintaining clear national priorities. This requires what might be called strategic empathy: understanding India’s legitimate concerns while expecting India to understand Nepal’s legitimate aspirations. Strategic empathy is different from strategic dependence. It is also different from strategic suspicion.
The Trust Deficit Begins at Home
There is another dimension that cannot be ignored. Nepal’s external trust deficit is closely connected to its internal trust deficit. Three developments are particularly important.
First, political behaviour has increasingly shifted from traditional coalition politics towards fluid alignments based on immediate interests, electoral calculations and access to power. The result is not merely instability but also a weakening of predictable political leadership.
For Nepal, the strategic lesson is clear: sovereignty is strengthened not merely by resisting influence but by developing the national capacity to create choices. Nepal must be able to use its resources, markets and geography in a timely manner, negotiate with greater institutional confidence and convert its location between India and China from a constraint into an asset.
Second, governance has moved from politicisation towards acute politicisation, while corruption risks becoming institutionalised. When citizens increasingly experience the state as a system that must be navigated through personal connections rather than as an impartial institution, public confidence declines.
Third, these trends produce a widening trust deficit—both within the state and in the state itself.
Political uncertainty weakens governance. Weak governance erodes trust. Declining trust further weakens political legitimacy. This cycle must be broken.
Nepal’s greatest strategic vulnerability may not ultimately be external. It may lie in its own lack of confidence in its institutions, governance and leadership. A country that lacks confidence in itself will struggle to generate confidence among its citizens, neighbours and international partners. That is why ‘National Confidence’ must become part of Nepal’s strategic thinking.
Can the Balen Shah Government Revisit the Relationship?
The new political generation represented by Prime Minister Balen Shah has an opportunity to do something different. But it must avoid two temptations: nationalism without strategy and strategic signalling without institutional preparation.
A stronger Nepal–India relationship cannot be built merely through rhetoric. It requires institutions capable of delivering agreements, policies capable of surviving political transitions and a diplomatic framework that looks beyond immediate disputes. One practical mechanism could be regularised at the highest level.
I recall a conversation with President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam in New Delhi in 2010, during which I raised questions about the complexities, sensitivities and need for greater transparency in Nepal–India relations. Two observations from that conversation have remained with me.
President Kalam remarked that the relationship between Nepal and India is, in many respects, shaped by who is able to exercise greater influence at a particular moment. His observation captured a fundamental reality of asymmetrical relationships: influence is rarely static. It shifts with political circumstances, economic interests, strategic priorities and, importantly, each country’s ability to translate its own assets and opportunities into tangible outcomes.
His second observation was even more pointed: “If Nepal cannot use its resources on time, India will not wait.”
Seen strategically, this was not simply a comment about economic resources. It was a reminder that geography creates opportunities, but opportunities have a time dimension. Nepal possesses substantial assets—hydropower, connectivity, markets, tourism, natural resources and its unique position between two major economies. But an opportunity that remains unutilised or is delayed by political uncertainty, institutional weakness or indecision can lose its strategic value. Neighbours and partners will inevitably pursue their interests and seek alternatives.
For India, it means being confident enough in its relationship with Nepal to allow a sovereign neighbour greater strategic space. Neighbourhood leadership should not be confused with neighbourhood management.
More than a decade later, the message remains relevant. Nepal–India relations should not be understood only through the lens of historical sensitivities, political influence or periodic disagreements. Their long-term stability will increasingly depend on whether both countries can convert their deep interdependence into mutually beneficial, transparent and outcome-oriented partnerships.
For Nepal, the strategic lesson is clear: sovereignty is strengthened not merely by resisting influence but by developing the national capacity to create choices. Nepal must be able to use its resources, markets and geography in a timely manner, negotiate with greater institutional confidence and convert its location between India and China from a constraint into an asset.
For India, the corresponding lesson is that durable influence is best sustained not through perceptions of hierarchy but through outcomes that generate legitimacy—connectivity that benefits both sides, energy partnerships that create mutual value, investment that produces jobs and growth, and a relationship in which Nepal’s sovereignty and strategic sensitivities are respected.
The strategic objective, therefore, should not be to eliminate asymmetry—something geography makes unrealistic—but to manage asymmetry through mutuality, transparency and credible interdependence.
President Kalam’s two observations can thus be read together as a broader strategic proposition: influence changes, but interests endure; geography is permanent, but opportunities are not. Nepal’s challenge is to act before opportunities pass, while India’s challenge is to ensure that its influence is translated into a partnership that Nepal sees as beneficial, credible and sustainable.
This brings me to a simple idea: the heads of government of Nepal and India should meet once a year, alternately in the two countries, with a clearly defined strategic agenda. The purpose should be straightforward: tell India what Nepal needs, understand what India needs and identify where the two countries’ interests converge. This would make summit diplomacy less ceremonial and more strategic.
It could become a mechanism for reviewing energy, connectivity, trade, investment, security, technology, disaster management and people-to-people relations, rather than simply responding to the crisis of the moment.
From Suspicion to Strategic Empathy
The opportunity before Nepal and India is therefore much larger than resolving individual disagreements. The relationship needs a new operating philosophy. Nepal should neither seek strategic distance from India nor accept strategic dependence on it, nor play China against India or the United States against both China and India.
India should neither seek to manage Nepal nor underestimate Nepal’s growing sense of national identity and strategic autonomy. Both countries should instead seek strategic confidence.
For Nepal, that means being confident enough to cooperate closely with India without compromising its sovereign choices. In addition, strategic autonomy should not mean strategic isolation.
The success of Nepal–India relations will ultimately depend on whether both countries can transform an inherited relationship into a modern strategic partnership—one based not on hierarchy, but on mutual confidence, sovereign equality and shared prosperity.
For India, it means being confident enough in its relationship with Nepal to allow a sovereign neighbour greater strategic space. Neighbourhood leadership should not be confused with neighbourhood management.
This is ultimately the paradox of good neighbourhood diplomacy: the strongest relationships are not those that eliminate differences, but those that create enough trust to manage differences without allowing them to define the relationship.
The past gives Nepal and India their foundation. Geography gives them necessity. Economics gives them opportunity. But strategic confidence must give them the future.
The central question should therefore no longer be: How do Nepal and India manage their sensitivities? It should be: What can Nepal and India build together that neither can build as effectively alone? That is the beginning of a reliable strategic relationship.
From proximity to partnership. From suspicion to strategic empathy. From transactional trust to strategic confidence. That should be the new direction of Nepal–India relations.
Conclusion
The next generation of Nepal–India relations should move from dependency to interdependence, from perception to institutionalised dialogue, from security-centric thinking to comprehensive security, and from transactional projects to strategic connectivity.
The relationship must also be insulated from the politics of the moment. Governments will change, political parties will rise and fall, and public perceptions will inevitably fluctuate. But the foundations of Nepal–India relations are deeper and more enduring than any particular government or political cycle.
Geography will remain—but strategy must strengthen. The open border will remain—but it must be managed more efficiently and securely. Economic interdependence will remain—but it should evolve into shared interdependence, creating value and opportunities for both sides. And the shared civilisational space will remain—but it must be sustained through stronger people-to-people bonds, mutual respect and a forward-looking partnership.
The strategic task, therefore, is not to insulate the relationship from legitimate differences, but to ensure that temporary political differences do not erode permanent strategic interests. A mature Nepal–India relationship must be resilient enough to absorb political fluctuations while continuing to deepen institutional, economic, social and strategic cooperation.
That is why the future of Nepal–India relations should not be hostage to personalities.
It should be anchored in institutions, interests, mutual respect and strategic foresight.
Knowing the past should give us wisdom. Understanding the present should give us realism. Anticipating the future should give us strategy.
The success of Nepal–India relations will ultimately depend on whether both countries can transform an inherited relationship into a modern strategic partnership—one based not on hierarchy, but on mutual confidence, sovereign equality and shared prosperity.
(Basnyat is a retired Major General of the Nepali Army and a strategic affairs analyst focusing on international relations, geopolitics, national security and evolving regional power dynamics. His writings examine the strategic forces shaping regional security, statecraft, foreign policy and the changing geopolitical order.)








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