The state visit of the Pakistani prime minister and army chief to China from May 23 to 26 took place around the time of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and has become a topic of discussion in South Asian media circles.
Pakistan and China signed 15 cooperation agreements covering security technology, media and information, food security, and economic and industrial cooperation, among other sectors. The leaders of both countries also issued an 18-point joint statement.
The statement highlighted that the Chinese side stands ready to work with Pakistan to fully implement the Global Security Initiative (GSI), establish the China-Pakistan Security Partnership, continue bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, and strengthen military-to-military ties, thereby playing a positive role in promoting regional peace and stability.
As part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is intended to improve regional connectivity and trade. China has committed billions of dollars to infrastructure, transportation, and energy projects under the CPEC framework.
Whether Pakistan’s growing dependence on China will ultimately strengthen its economy, and when the country will fully benefit from the CPEC, remains uncertain.
Will increasing Chinese investment in Pakistan bring regional peace and prosperity, as claimed by Islamabad? This article also examines the strategic dimensions of China’s involvement under the CPEC.
Chronology and Cohesion
Pakistan was the first non-communist country to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1950, the year the PRC was established. On May 21, 1951, China and Pakistan formally established diplomatic relations. However, while Pakistan emerged as an independent state in 1947 following the partition of British India, China represents one of the world’s oldest civilizations.
Pakistan is often described as a relatively young nation that adopted India as its principal strategic rival; over time, maintaining this rivalry became a central element of its security narrative.
This article, however, does not focus on Indo-Pak relations. Instead, it examines China’s rapidly expanding economy and its growing geopolitical aspirations in Pakistan. These ambitions were formalized when Pakistan signed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement with China on April 20, 2015, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Islamabad.
According to the World Bank’s 2015 report, Pakistan’s progress in reducing poverty began to slow noticeably after 2015. Between 2015 and 2018, the pace of poverty reduction fell to less than one percentage point annually. Since 2020, a series of overlapping crises have exposed weaknesses in the country’s poverty-reduction efforts.
Even today, Pakistan’s economy continues to face significant structural instability. It remains heavily burdened by debt servicing obligations, declining foreign direct investment, and persistent inflation, despite occasional periods of short-term stabilization. These concerns are also reflected in the UNDP’s 2025 report.
Studies examining Pakistan’s declining Human Development Index suggest that the military’s enormous influence over policymaking has contributed to the prioritization of defense spending over social-sector investment.
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China and Pakistan have steadily strengthened their military ties, perhaps due to Pakistan’s strategic geographic location. The two countries signed significant military hardware agreements during the 1960s and 1970s, while China provided Pakistan with nuclear technology and missile assistance in the 1990s.
Similarly, between 2000 and 2010, the two countries expanded defense-industrial cooperation through joint production agreements. Over the past decade and a half, the military’s influence in Pakistani politics has increased further, and Pakistan has become heavily dependent on China, importing approximately 80 percent of its weapons and defense equipment from a single source.
Peaceful or Anxious?
Pakistan hopes that China will help it emerge from its economic difficulties. However, this may not materialize, and it is equally possible that Beijing’s interests in Pakistan could deepen the country’s dependence on Chinese financing and military support.
Critics argue that the CPEC serves China’s broader strategic and economic objectives in South Asia as part of the BRI. Nevertheless, the Chinese government presents the project as a vehicle for stability and peace. At the inaugural Belt and Road Forum in 2017, President Xi Jinping emphasized the initiative’s role in promoting development and connectivity.
China’s approach under the CPEC appears to combine state-led economic development with efforts to consolidate influence in fragile or conflict-affected regions.
The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan continues to expand under the rhetoric of a “New Broad Consensus.” However, the international community has yet to reach a consensus regarding China’s strategic ambitions under the BRI. In his book How China Loses: The Pushback Against Chinese Ambitions, author and senior researcher Luke Patey presents several relevant case studies.
Patey compares Chinese investments in Sudan before 2011 with the CPEC experience. According to him, Pakistan’s restive province of Balochistan bears notable similarities to South Sudan before its independence. Southern Sudanese communities were excluded from economic opportunities and exploited for their land and resources by the central government in Khartoum.
Similarly, Patey argues that the political and security elite in Islamabad have marginalized the people of Balochistan and deprived them of meaningful economic opportunities.
China’s experience in Pakistan also resembles aspects of its involvement in Sudan. Prior to South Sudan’s independence, Chinese oil investments became targets of rebel attacks during the prolonged civil conflict. Likewise, a decade before the launch of the CPEC, the China Harbour Engineering Company unsuccessfully attempted to develop Gwadar Port. However, the company and other Chinese projects faced persistent security threats.
Following the launch of the CPEC, Gwadar was transformed into a heavily militarized zone. A 15,000-member Pakistani security force was established to protect approximately 30,000 Chinese nationals working in Pakistan, many of whom were involved in infrastructure projects.
Patey’s study, conducted five years ago, remains relevant today. Attacks by Baloch insurgent groups in CPEC-related areas continue to occur.
Whether such concerns are justified remains a matter of debate, but they underscore the potential for increased geopolitical competition and instability across South Asia.
Whether Pakistan’s growing dependence on China will ultimately strengthen its economy, and when the country will fully benefit from the CPEC, remains uncertain. Many Pakistani experts remain critical of the initiative. Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director of the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), argues that “in order to effectively implement CPEC, Pakistan must make significant adjustments to its governance paradigm, as Chinese expectations and Pakistan’s capacity remain out of sync.”
All-Weather Friendship and Gray-Zone Warfare
Pakistan, grappling with domestic instability and tensions along its Afghan border, has become increasingly economically vulnerable. The country continues to be influenced by the legacy of military conflicts with its neighbors and the historical trauma of losing East Pakistan in 1971. As a result, Pakistan often appears more focused on preserving state stability than on fully leveraging its geostrategic location for economic development.
China has emerged as the world’s second-largest economy and views the United States as its principal competitor. Although Beijing advocates peace, prosperity, and multilateral cooperation, critics argue that it increasingly employs gray-zone tactics under a strategy sometimes described as “talk and take” or “fight and talk.”
China may frame many of its actions in terms of defense and national security, but its ambition to become a global superpower is widely recognized. In this context, an article titled Six Wars That China Is Sure to Fight in the Next Fifty Years, published by the Hong Kong-based newspaper Wen Wei Po in 2015—the same year the CPEC was signed—offers insight into perceptions of China’s long-term strategic thinking and its growing investments in neighboring developing countries, including Pakistan.
Last but not least, China’s ambitious projects such as the CPEC, combined with Pakistan’s growing dependence on Chinese economic and defense support, have fueled speculation about whether Pakistan could eventually become a satellite state of China. Whether such concerns are justified remains a matter of debate, but they underscore the potential for increased geopolitical competition and instability across South Asia.
(The opinions expressed herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial position of Khabarhub — Editor)
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