President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held bilateral talks in Anchorage, Alaska, on 15 August, following a virtual conference between Trump and leaders from Ukraine and Europe regarding a ceasefire and subsequent peace in the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Trump and Putin signaled that they wanted to bypass a ceasefire while negotiating a deal to end the war, urging a settlement that would require Ukrainian territorial concessions along with security guarantees for Ukraine.
This isn’t the first time; Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with security assurances after the signing of the Belarus Memorandum of Security Assurances at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) on 5 December 1994, signed by the Russian Federation, the UK, and the US.
The four memorandums were originally signed by the four nuclear powers: Russia, the UK, Ukraine, and the US. China and France gave individual assurances in separate documents.
A special delegation of European leaders joined Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for a White House visit intended to bolster Kyiv as well as European security, as diplomacy intensified to end the Russia-Ukraine war.
Designing provisions that impose high costs on Russia for future aggression is essential to ensuring that any agreement will hold, as Putin’s war in Ukraine is not just about territory—it’s a calculated move rooted in history to reclaim Russia’s global influence and potentially redraw Europe’s borders.
The US has maintained that the memorandum is a political commitment rather than a binding legal contract, raising broader concerns about the reliability of such assurances in future international peace efforts. While the memorandum includes provisions for consultation in case of disputes, it does not mandate military assistance.
Prospects for a lasting settlement to Europe’s bloodiest war in eighty years appeared remote, but the parties vowed to press ahead with diplomacy.
The proposed resolution to Moscow from the White House will bring about consequences in global geopolitics. The West will have to revive a proven strategy and build strong deterrence; emerging and rising powers will have to find their discourse, while vulnerable and small nations will have to search for interdependency and political leverage for their territorial integrity, sovereignty, and strategic credibility.
Though Trump was pushing hard, the meeting for peace in Europe to end the war saw little success. The meeting came after US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff held “highly productive” talks with Putin in Moscow.
Trump vowed that he could end the war within 24 hours of taking office and repeatedly argued that the war “never would have happened” if he had been president at the time of Russia’s invasion in 2022. The theme has been pledged as “peace through strength” as a presidential candidate, and the effort continues.
Trump stated that he was “disappointed” by Putin, who had been given an 8 August deadline to agree to an immediate ceasefire or face more severe US sanctions. As the deadline passed, Trump instead announced he and Putin would meet in person on 15 August.
Both are permanent members of the UN and the top two in terms of military capabilities, though the US military significantly outspends Russia on defense, maintains a much larger military budget, a broader and more robust global logistical network, and holds a technological and qualitative advantage over Russia across most domains.
The talks between Trump, the European leaders, and Zelenskyy at the White House and the proposal for peace in Europe raise geostrategic implications for the world in terms of alliances and allies, in addition to vulnerability for weak and small nations regarding sovereignty and strategic dependence.
This proposed deal reflects a high-stakes diplomatic gamble—offering Russia territory in return for peace and Western-style security guarantees for Ukraine—a compromise that could either end the war or fracture Western unity, depending on how it’s implemented.
Posture Over Policy? Visual Signals and Strategic Messaging in High-Stakes Diplomacy
The approach to the talks and the outcome has received mixed responses. The Trump-Putin summit took place at a US military base, with B-2 bombers that had recently struck Iranian nuclear facilities flying overhead with F-35 escorts, while Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister since 2004, arrived wearing a Союз Советских Социалистических Республик (CCCP) t-shirt—a Russian abbreviation for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
Wearing a CCCP shirt to peace talks is a bold and deliberate gesture. It likely signals nostalgia for Soviet power, rejection of the Western-led world order, potential territorial or ideological ambitions, and undermines the sincerity of the peace process. The escorts are not just a gesture but also encapsulate the idea that “peace comes through strength.”
This reflects a central tenet of US foreign policy thinking, particularly in more conservative or realist circles. It implies that military, economic, and diplomatic strength deter conflict by discouraging adversaries from taking aggressive actions. It’s political theater—meant to signal strength, defiance, and historical continuity.
The visual images in the White House highlight how spatial arrangements convey unspoken messages of authority and equality in diplomacy.
The European leaders sit in a uniform line awaiting entry, stripping away formal power hierarchies and presenting a rare moment of shared human vulnerability—what has been dubbed the “principal’s office” effect.
In contrast, other images set in the Oval Office reaffirm traditional power structures, with the US President positioned commandingly behind the Resolute Desk while others sit around the periphery.
Together, these scenes illustrate how diplomatic environments subtly shape perceptions of power, reminding us that in international relations, posture and placement can speak as loudly as policy.
These images contrast sharply with Trump’s grand gesture of welcoming Putin on the tarmac with a red carpet, highlighting differing approaches to projecting power and respect.
This is not the first time European leaders have gathered in the US for negotiations. When Washington pushed for peace in 2025, the G7 summit in 2018 bore similarities. European leaders leaned in—physically and diplomatically—trying to corral a mercurial US into multilateral consensus. In 2025, they sit across a gilded desk, attentive, as Washington once again plays convener-in-chief. The question for Europe is not whether America can broker “peace,” but whether the kind of peace Washington presses for enhances or erodes Europe’s long-term stability.
The Trump-Putin meeting, which lasted almost three hours, included a one-on-one conversation in the American leader’s limousine en route to the main venue and a small group discussion of “three on three.”
The Russian delegation included Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, while the US delegation included Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff.
The US Vice President, speaking to the US Air Force’s 501st Combat Support Wing and the 99th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron at Royal Air Force Base Fairford, said, “You guys are the reason why we can go into a negotiation with strength… Nothing that we do as an administration is possible without the hard work, the courage, and the skill that you guys bring.”
Vance was capping off a high-stakes trip to the UK, meeting with European leaders to discuss the war in Ukraine ahead of Trump and Putin’s meeting. The US knows there’s no soft power without hard power.
Peace in Europe is drifting around territorial concessions by Ukraine with security guarantees. The presence of the European leaders, along with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) chiefs, is significant for finding a new approach to European security, rather than the usual US-led participation.
NATO will now be left to the Europeans. The US is investing in Ukraine’s future; supporting Ukraine is less about short-term profit and more about long-term positioning in a changing global order. It will serve US geopolitical strategy, economic interests, and global leadership.
The territory at stake is economically and strategically valuable. Whether consciously or not, Trump’s approach could benefit Russia’s resource control and reduce Ukraine’s long-term energy and economic independence—a consequence that aligns with strategic interests, if not explicitly resource-driven motives.
Both the 2014 Crimean annexation and the 2022 full-scale invasion were direct breaches of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the Minsk II agreement.
The Budapest agreement obligated Russia to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and existing borders in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.
Putin told the press that the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict was the main topic of the summit, just after the talks. The Russian leader also called for a new beginning in bilateral relations and a return to cooperation. He invited Trump to Moscow.
The signatories, the UK and the US, did not fully uphold their part of the bargain by failing to provide a strong enough security guarantee to deter Russia’s aggression, which is seen as a form of deception by omission or a failure of their obligation—although they did provide military aid, financial support, and economic sanctions on Russia, while ruling out direct intervention.
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US stated that Russian involvement was a breach of its Budapest Memorandum obligations to Ukraine and a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Putin described the Ukrainian situation as a revolution: “a new state arises, but with this state and in respect to this state, we have not signed any obligatory documents.”
Russia stated that it had never been under obligation to “force any part of Ukraine’s civilian population to stay in Ukraine against its will.”
Analyzing the political Budapest Memorandum agreement, it is not a legally binding treaty enforcing legal obligations. It provides security assurances—not guarantees—from Russia, the UK, and the US to Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons and joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state.
The US has maintained that the memorandum is a political commitment rather than a binding legal contract, raising broader concerns about the reliability of such assurances in future international peace efforts. While the memorandum includes provisions for consultation in case of disputes, it does not mandate military assistance.
The 13-point Minsk II agreement, signed in February 2015 to end Russia’s limited invasion of Ukraine in 2014, was signed with representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the leaders of the separatist-held regions Donetsk and Luhansk. The leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine gathered in Minsk to mark the occasion and issued a declaration of support.
Most peace deals lead to peace, but agreements between Ukraine and Russia laid the groundwork for a full-scale Russian invasion in 2022.
Territorial Trade-Off at Center of Trump-Putin Peace Talks, Sparking Alarm in Europe and Kyiv
Following the meeting with Putin, Trump told European leaders that he had offered to support a plan to end the war that involved Ukrainian territorial concessions to Russia, as reported by The New York Times.
Though Trump had issued a stern warning to Russia, signaling “very severe consequences” if a ceasefire was not reached before the Alaska summit, this demand was not met. Trump announced progress achieved in the talks but noted that the two sides had not reached an agreement on everything. However, he suggested that if initial discussions proved fruitful, a follow-up meeting involving all three parties could be arranged.
The peace process remains highly fluid. European allies are taking the lead on crafting security frameworks and ceasefire contingencies, while Trump’s involvement adds both momentum and uncertainty.
Witkoff said it was the first time he witnessed Putin agree with Trump to allow the US and European allies to offer Ukraine a security guarantee resembling NATO’s collective defense mandate as part of an eventual deal to end the three-and-a-half-year war.
“We were able to win the following concession: That the US could offer Article 5-like protection, which is one of the real reasons why Ukraine wants to be in NATO.”
Putin told the press that the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict was the main topic of the summit, just after the talks. The Russian leader also called for a new beginning in bilateral relations and a return to cooperation. He invited Trump to Moscow.
Putin’s stance was criticized as a way to buy time and press Russia’s battlefield advances, and apprehension was expressed over Trump’s land swap proposal by Zelenskyy and the European allies.
After meeting European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in person and other European leaders virtually, Zelenskyy prepared to travel to the White House to meet with Trump. The European leaders said that Putin’s continued refusal to accept a ceasefire is “complicating” efforts to reach a peace deal, and added that the current front lines of the war should be the basis for peace talks.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and von der Leyen will accompany Zelenskyy to Washington, DC, to confirm a firm, united front to the US president in the White House talks.
The one-on-one nature of the Trump-Putin meeting—excluding Ukrainian and European representatives—has sparked concern among the allies, who worry the resulting agreement might not fully reflect Ukraine’s interests.
“We need real negotiations, which means we can start where the front line is now,” Zelenskyy said, adding that European leaders support this and reiterating his long-held position that it is necessary to establish a ceasefire in order to then negotiate a final deal.
As diplomacy intensified on ending the Russia-Ukraine war, the diplomatic momentum remains slow, with limited progress—talks continue with no concrete ceasefire or summit confirmed.
European engagement is taking proactive steps through coalitions and planning for peacekeeping or assurance forces, while Trump shows sporadic commitment, signaling support but with shifting priorities and growing impatience.
Russia’s position is ambiguous—talks remain conditional, with Russia unlikely to budge without concessions that Ukraine rejects.
The peace process remains highly fluid. European allies are taking the lead on crafting security frameworks and ceasefire contingencies, while Trump’s involvement adds both momentum and uncertainty.
A meaningful breakthrough remains elusive, but diplomatic groundwork continues—most notably through European cohesion and readiness to back Ukraine with more tangible guarantees. There is fragile optimism as Europe steps into a more assertive role, but a binding resolution remains elusive. Prospects for a lasting settlement to Europe’s bloodiest war in eighty years appear remote, but the parties have vowed to press ahead with diplomacy.
The shifting US stance may fundamentally alter global alliances, compelling nations to seek new defense strategies, strengthen regional ties, and even consider nuclear deterrence as insurance against unpredictable US policy.
Three rounds of talks between Russia and Ukraine this summer, held at Trump’s behest, have yet to bring the two sides any closer to peace. The limited participation of the US—or even absence—in Europe is a strategic win for Russia.
Superpower Diplomacy and the Strategic Dilemma for Smaller States
A new paradigm—Superpower Diplomacy—is emerging as a defining feature of contemporary international relations. The Russia–US summit in Alaska exemplifies this shift, potentially marking the beginning of a new diplomatic era in which global power dynamics are increasingly shaped by direct engagement between the world’s foremost powers.
Zelenskyy and EU leaders met Trump before his Alaska talks with Putin to set demands: no land talks before a ceasefire; no sanctions relief for Russia; Russia must pay war damages ($500bn–$1tn); Ukraine joins NATO/EU; and Russia returns POWs and abducted children.
But Kyiv’s first and primary demand is a durable ceasefire before any land discussions. This emerging dynamic underscores the importance of proactive, diversified diplomacy.
By engaging simultaneously with multiple power centers and leveraging both bilateral and multilateral platforms, capitals can mitigate the risks of external decision-making overshadowing domestic priorities. Integrating Superpower Diplomacy awareness into national strategic planning allows weak and small nations to anticipate geopolitical shifts, protect sovereignty, and position themselves as capable actors in a rapidly evolving, polycentric regional order.
Under this framework, superpowers often make strategic decisions that reverberate far beyond their immediate interests. Weak and smaller nations—particularly those embroiled in conflict or facing economic vulnerability—risk having their fates determined on their behalf.
This reality heightens the strategic challenge for countries seeking to maintain autonomy and secure national interests in an environment dominated by the agendas of major powers.
This dynamic underscores the urgent need for mid-sized and smaller states to diversify their diplomatic, security, and economic partnerships to safeguard national sovereignty and preserve strategic autonomy.
For the superpowers, it was a historic moment of soft power diplomacy when Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1996 in exchange for international security assurances under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
The Minsk II agreement also paved the way for peace in Europe. But those assurances were violated 20 years later. This process became a striking example of how fragile diplomatic guarantees can be in the face of hard power.
All countries, particularly US allies, are closely monitoring Trump’s evolving foreign policy—especially his approach to peace in Europe and its broader implications. Trump has refused to commit to defending Taiwan, even as China escalates threats.
His suspension of military aid to Ukraine has strained ties with Europe and highlighted his transactional approach to alliances. While Trump demands that Europe take on more of its defense burden, he appears less demanding of Asian allies. India is now diplomatically seeking alternatives after facing a 50% tariff on purchases of Russian oil.
There is growing concern about America’s reliability, with countries responding in two main ways—through transactional diplomacy and by reducing dependency on the US.
To secure continued US protection amid growing threats from China and North Korea, East Asian allies—Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—are offering massive economic deals. Japan pledged $1 trillion toward US industries; South Korea is also preparing major US investments, and Taiwan is investing $100 billion in US chip plants.
Simultaneously, these countries are preparing for a future where US backing might waver. Australia is strengthening regional security ties; Japan is pushing for greater military independence. There’s renewed discussion in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan about potentially developing nuclear weapons if US support weakens.
The proposed Ukraine peace deal—discussed by Trump, European leaders, and Zelenskyy—focuses on achieving a ceasefire followed by a negotiated settlement, potentially involving territorial concessions by Ukraine to Russia. In return, Ukraine would receive NATO-style security guarantees from the US and European allies, offering long-term protection without full NATO membership.
The shifting US stance may fundamentally alter global alliances, compelling nations to seek new defense strategies, strengthen regional ties, and even consider nuclear deterrence as insurance against unpredictable US policy.
Three Futures, One Warning: How Small States Can Read Europe’s Unfolding Crisis
Small and weak states—whether in Europe, Africa, Asia, or elsewhere—should draw critical lessons from Europe’s turbulence. Here are three scenarios and corresponding lessons:
The Most Likely Scenario: A continuation of a “frozen conflict” model, where the war in Ukraine settles into a prolonged stalemate without a formal peace treaty. This would mirror the Korean Peninsula or Transnistria, with entrenched frontlines, intermittent clashes, and heavy militarization along NATO’s eastern flank.
Under this scenario, Europe experiences a tense but manageable coexistence—Russia secures de facto control over parts of eastern Ukraine, NATO strengthens its deterrence posture, and the EU focuses on resilience through economic adaptation and defense spending.
The Least Likely Scenario: A return to a cooperative, inclusive security order akin to the post–Cold War optimism of the 1990s, where Russia and the West engage in confidence-building, arms control, and economic integration. The current level of mistrust, competing visions of sovereignty, and entrenched national narratives makes this outcome highly improbable in the near to medium term.
Such a transformation would require either a profound leadership change in Russia that accepts European norms or a strategic realignment within NATO and the EU toward accommodating Russian security concerns—both scenarios that are far from today’s realities.
Thus, Europe’s trajectory points toward managed insecurity, where peace is relative, partial, and constantly tested by geopolitical rivalry rather than underpinned by a settled order.
A Possible but Unstable Scenario: A more dynamic yet unstable form of peace, where negotiations—driven by war fatigue, economic pressures, or leadership changes in Moscow, Kyiv, or Washington—lead to partial compromises.
Such a settlement could involve demilitarized zones, international monitoring, or conditional sanctions relief, but it would not resolve deeper grievances. Instead, it would produce an uneasy equilibrium, vulnerable to breakdown, especially if domestic politics in Russia or Europe shift dramatically.
Strategic Measures and Policy Recommendations
For small states in South Asia, five strategic priorities emerge:
Diversification of Foreign Relations: Cultivate simultaneous strategic partnerships with multiple regional powers—such as China, India, and others—to balance external influence. Deepen engagement with multilateral platforms like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to enhance diplomatic leverage and avoid overdependence on any single actor.
Economic Resilience: Strengthen economic sovereignty by diversifying trade corridors through overland connectivity and improved maritime infrastructure. Promote domestic industrialization and develop value-added export sectors to reduce reliance on remittance-driven economies.
National Security Autonomy: Invest in indigenous defense and paramilitary capabilities while maintaining selective, non-aligned cooperation with traditional security partners. Build capacity in intelligence and strategic forecasting to better navigate shifting dynamics in great power competition.
The strategic path for weak and small nations in the coming decade requires careful calibration between economic development, security autonomy, and diplomatic agility. By understanding the evolving concept of Superpower Diplomacy, diversifying partnerships, and strengthening domestic institutions, nations can navigate complexities while safeguarding national sovereignty.
Strengthening of Institutions: Modernize governance frameworks to ensure bureaucratic agility in the face of regional disruptions. Incorporate scenario-based planning to prepare for potential external shocks such as major power summits, diplomatic shifts, or regional conflicts.
Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Project a consistent image of neutrality and peace promotion on the international stage. Leverage cultural diplomacy and diaspora networks to sustain global relevance and autonomy from major power agendas.
Conclusion
If these contradictions remain unresolved, Europe risks sliding into a Cold War 2.0—not global in scope like the US–Soviet rivalry, but regional, grinding, and draining. Peace in Europe today is neither imminent nor impossible—it depends on whether Europeans themselves can imagine a security order that accommodates both great power realities and the continent’s democratic aspirations. The war in Ukraine will be the litmus test of that vision.
The proposed Ukraine peace deal—discussed by Trump, European leaders, and Zelenskyy—focuses on achieving a ceasefire followed by a negotiated settlement, potentially involving territorial concessions by Ukraine to Russia. In return, Ukraine would receive NATO-style security guarantees from the US and European allies, offering long-term protection without full NATO membership.
While Trump has reportedly supported the land-swap idea, Zelenskyy strongly opposes it, demanding that any talks begin with a ceasefire based on current front lines. European leaders, though supportive of peace efforts, stand behind Zelenskyy. They are divided—supportive of peace talks but skeptical, and reject any proposal seen as rewarding Russian aggression. This highlights divisions over how to balance peace with Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Key obstacles remain: Putin’s position is firm, with no ceasefire yet in place. His diplomatic engagement may be a tactic to buy time on the battlefield. Zelenskyy opposes territorial concessions, fearing the deal compromises Ukraine’s sovereignty.
But the process—and the exercise of foreign policy under US initiative—raises serious questions about superpower reliability and trust. Ukraine did not stand alone—Russia, the UK, the US, France, and China were all part of the agreements that Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus signed. Now, with debate raging: If Ukraine had not signed the Minsk II and Budapest agreements, would Russia have attacked Ukraine with its nuclear potential?
The strategic path for weak and small nations in the coming decade requires careful calibration between economic development, security autonomy, and diplomatic agility. By understanding the evolving concept of Superpower Diplomacy, diversifying partnerships, and strengthening domestic institutions, nations can navigate complexities while safeguarding national sovereignty.
This integrated approach positions weak and small nations not merely as passive recipients of great-power decisions but as active shapers of their own strategic future.
Resilience in insecurity, flexibility in fragile peace, and institution-building for rare stability are the three enduring lessons for small and weak states.
(Basnyat, a Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, is a strategic analyst and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand.)
(Views expressed in this opinion are the writer’s and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Khabarhub — Editor)
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