The strain in Bangladesh–India relations following the political upheaval of 2024 is more than a bilateral dispute; it is a stress test for South Asia’s regional order. As Dhaka and New Delhi trade accusations and harden postures, familiar fears of strategic drift and external encroachment have resurfaced. But global experience suggests that moments of rupture are also moments of choice—between reactive politics that deepen instability and deliberate recalibration that preserves interdependence while adapting to new political realities.
The turbulence in Bangladesh–India relations following the August 2024 ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has prompted dire predictions of a strategic rupture in South Asia. Such conclusions are analytically premature. What is unfolding is neither unprecedented nor irreversible. Rather, it reflects a familiar pattern in international politics: domestic political upheaval intersecting with deep regional interdependence. History suggests that the outcome will be shaped less by the shock itself than by how both sides manage the aftermath.
Bangladesh and India remain bound by geography, economics, energy networks, and security imperatives. These structural realities cannot be undone by rhetorical escalation, episodic border tensions, or temporary diplomatic freezes. Yet global experience also shows that even highly interdependent neighbors can slide into prolonged hostility when domestic legitimacy crises, identity politics, and external opportunism converge. The present moment is therefore best understood not as a break, but as a test.
A Relationship Over-Personalised
India’s close alignment with Sheikh Hasina during her fifteen-year rule delivered tangible gains. New Delhi benefited from unprecedented security cooperation, reduced insurgent activity in its northeastern states, expanded transit access, and growing economic integration. Dhaka, in turn, gained Indian political backing, infrastructure investment, and regional connectivity. Indian policymakers frequently described this period as a shonali adhyay—a golden chapter in bilateral relations.
But that alignment came at a cost. India’s overt support for an increasingly unpopular and authoritarian government amplified anti-India sentiment within Bangladesh and left New Delhi exposed when a mass uprising forced Hasina from power in August 2024. India’s decision to grant her refuge—despite demands from Dhaka that she face justice—deepened public resentment. The fallout illustrates a recurring error in regional diplomacy: conflating stable state-to-state relations with the political fortunes of a single ruling party.
The aftermath has been marked by recrimination. Both governments claim to have reached out, both accuse the other of provocation, and both have engaged in symbolic retaliation—from trade restrictions to border standoffs. This pattern has entrenched negative perceptions without delivering strategic benefits to either side.
Domestic Volatility and Externalised Politics
Global precedents suggest that bilateral strain often intensifies when governments face internal stress. Argentina’s Falklands gamble in 1982 and repeated India–Pakistan escalations illustrate how domestic legitimacy deficits can be externalised through nationalist posturing.
Bangladesh today exhibits some of these dynamics. Political polarisation, economic pressures, youth frustration, and contested authority have created fertile ground for anti-India narratives. India—large, proximate, and historically influential—becomes a convenient symbol onto which domestic grievances are projected. This does not necessarily reflect a coherent state strategy aimed at confrontation, but it does make foreign policy vulnerable to populist mobilisation.
India, too, faces domestic constraints. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s Hindu nationalist orientation, sensitivities surrounding minority issues in Bangladesh, concerns over illegal migration, and electoral calculations in border states such as Assam and West Bengal limit diplomatic flexibility. As seen in U.S.–Mexico relations during periods of migration stress, even well-institutionalised democracies can adopt hardened external postures when domestic audiences demand visible firmness.
Interdependence as Strategic Ballast
Despite the rhetoric, the structural foundations of Bangladesh–India relations remain intact. Trade flows, power-grid connectivity, transit agreements, border management mechanisms, and counterterrorism cooperation form a dense web of mutual dependence. This resembles France–Germany relations during periods of European Union discord: politically contentious yet operationally indispensable.
Global experience suggests that such interdependence rarely collapses abruptly. Even at the height of U.S.–China rivalry, trade, financial links, and crisis-management channels have prevented outright rupture. Turkey’s repeated political disputes with the European Union have not undone decades of economic integration.
For Bangladesh, distancing from India would impose immediate economic and logistical costs, particularly in energy security, access to regional markets, and transit routes.
For India, instability in Bangladesh directly affects its northeastern states, Bay of Bengal maritime security, and regional connectivity initiatives. These structural incentives act as brakes on escalation—even when political signaling points in the opposite direction.
Hedging, Not Alignment
Periods of bilateral strain often invite third-party engagement. Bangladesh’s outreach to China, and India’s sensitivity to it, reflect a broader global pattern of middle powers hedging amid intensifying great-power competition.
Vietnam offers a useful analogy. Hanoi has diversified partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and others while avoiding overt strategic alignment against China. Sri Lanka’s experience, by contrast, shows how hedging can slide into dependency when diversification is poorly managed. The lesson is clear: substituting one dependency for another rarely enhances sovereignty.
For Bangladesh, seeking strategic autonomy through diversified external partnerships is rational.
For India, responding to such hedging with coercive pressure risks accelerating strategic drift. The history of U.S. relations with Egypt and Pakistan demonstrates that influence erodes more rapidly when engagement gives way to conditionality alone.
The Election Window
Bangladesh’s national elections, scheduled for 12 February 2026, offer a potential reset. With the Awami League barred from contesting the polls, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is widely viewed as the frontrunner. Historically, relations between India and the BNP have been fraught. Yet in Bangladesh’s transformed political landscape, a BNP-led government may represent the most viable pathway for restoring a working relationship.
India is unlikely to fully normalise ties with the current interim government led by Muhammad Yunus. But waiting passively for electoral outcomes carries risks. Anti-India rhetoric remains an easy mobilising tool in Bangladeshi politics, just as muscular nationalism resonates with segments of the Indian electorate. Upcoming elections in Indian border states and the looming expiration of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty could further inflame tensions.
Likely Pathways Ahead
Three trajectories appear plausible.
The most likely is a managed but cooler relationship. Diplomatic rhetoric remains restrained, domestic audiences are appeased, yet trade, energy cooperation, and security coordination continue quietly. This mirrors post-Brexit UK–EU relations: politically strained but functionally indispensable.
A second scenario involves gradual strategic rebalancing. Bangladesh diversifies external partnerships while maintaining functional ties with India, reducing India’s relative influence without severing interdependence. The main risk here is misperception—each side interpreting hedging as hostility.
The least likely but most damaging scenario is escalatory drift, triggered by communal incidents, border mismanagement, or prolonged diplomatic disengagement. Global examples—from Armenia–Azerbaijan to Sudan–Chad—show how localised incidents can spiral when crisis-management mechanisms weaken or become politicised. Recent anti-India violence in Bangladesh underscores this danger.
The Preventive Lesson
The central lesson from global experience is that such moments are not predictive; they are preventive. They signal the need to insulate foreign policy from domestic volatility through institutions rather than personalities. Quiet diplomacy, crisis hotlines, economic safeguard mechanisms, and depoliticised border management have proven effective elsewhere—from Chile–Argentina water disputes to Indonesia–Malaysia maritime tensions.
For India, strategic patience combined with calibrated engagement is not weakness but statecraft. New Delhi should prepare a post-election charm offensive—reversing visa restrictions, expanding people-to-people exchanges, and demonstrating that its initiatives are mutually beneficial rather than politically extractive. Crucially, India should cultivate ties across Bangladesh’s political spectrum rather than repeating the mistake of over-personalisation.
For Bangladesh, stabilising domestic governance and resisting the instrumentalisation of foreign policy for internal legitimacy are essential to preserving strategic autonomy. The next government must curb extremism, manage borders responsibly, and reassure India on security concerns without surrendering sovereignty.
Implications for South Asia
Bangladesh–India relations are not merely bilateral; they are foundational to South Asian stability. Regional connectivity corridors, Bay of Bengal maritime security, energy cooperation, and emerging supply chains depend on functional cooperation between the two. A prolonged chill would not empower smaller states; it would invite deeper external penetration into an already fragmented region.
South Asia has often absorbed the lessons of geopolitics after crises rather than before them. The current strain offers an opportunity to do otherwise. The question is not whether Bangladesh and India can afford to recalibrate their relationship—they must. The question is whether that recalibration will be deliberate and strategic, or reactive and destabilising. History offers ample warning. It also offers guidance.
(Basnyat is a Maj. Gen. (Retd.) and a strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu. He writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy, and stability.)
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