India and Nepal have long been at odds over the regions of Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, and Kalapani (LLK). Trade through the region was conducted under an agreement between China and India, even before the Nepalese Parliament amended the constitution in 2020 to include the disputed territories.
Due to the cooling of political and diplomatic relations between China and India, trade via the Lipulekh area was banned following the standoff between the PLA and the Indian Army on the Doklam and Ladakh frontiers, which caused geopolitical ripples throughout South Asia. It is possible that both Beijing and Delhi held cartographic as well as geopolitical interests in the Lipulekh region.
Coincidentally, when Nepal issued a new map in 2020, KP Oli of the CPN-UML was the Prime Minister — a position he holds again today. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Forum in China, the Prime Minister of Nepal conveyed to Chinese President Xi Jinping that the agreement between China and India to trade via Lipulekh involved territory that belongs to Nepal, and that the Government of Nepal has registered a strong objection to the same.
This is the first time Nepal has raised the LLK issue directly with China. However, the Chinese side’s press statement makes no reference of LLK, leading to uncertainty. Did China not take Nepal’s concerns seriously? Due to the contradictory statements issued by Nepal and China, the debate in Nepal has shifted from “Did Oli bring up the matter with China?” to “Did Oli actually raise it at all?”
Efforts to elevate India–Nepal relations from a historical and cultural footing to a strictly “geostrategic” level could inadvertently weaken their foundational ties.
Even if it seems reasonable, the Prime Minister ought to further address this matter in Nepal’s sovereign parliament. At first glance, it appears that China reached an agreement with India, but the way China is trying to sidestep the issue with Nepal regarding the LLK region suggests that China may be consolidating India’s claim to the territory.
Similarly, by formally incorporating Nepal within its security initiative, what message is China trying to send to Nepal and to the rest of the world? According to a statement released by China, Nepal supports China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI). However, after China’s claim, questions began to arise in Nepal. In response, Prime Minister Oli’s economic and development advisor — who was part of the visiting delegation — clarified:
“Prime Minister Oli’s visit was primarily for the SCO Plus summit. On the sidelines of such sessions, no agreement or understanding is usually signed. Promoting Nepal as a party to the GSI on a topic for which no agreement exists is totally incorrect.”
However, the Chinese statement clearly states that Nepal supports the GSI. This has led some to wonder: how did China unilaterally include Nepal in the GSI? After all, China is a mature country. No one — not even China — can engage another nation in a security-related matter without proper consultation and consent.
To counter China’s claim, Nepal — as a signatory and implementing state of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — must take responsible political and diplomatic action.
China has a long and complex history with Nepal. While diplomatic relations between modern China and Nepal appear strong today, there was a time when Chinese emperors attempted to invade Kathmandu. Before Tibet came under Chinese control, relations between China and Nepal were frequently tense.
History shows that after several rounds of negotiations, Nepal and China signed the Treaty of Betrawati in 1849 BS to end the conflict. Nepal lost the privileges granted under the Kerung Agreement, which had allowed it to collect annual payments from Tibet. In contrast, under the new treaty, Nepal was required to send quinquennial tribute missions — ceremonial gifts every five years — and acknowledge the Qing Emperor’s suzerainty over Nepal. In return, the Qing dynasty agreed to provide military protection to Nepal against external threats.
Additionally, Nepal’s border was only partially preserved, and it was forced to cede its rights over Kuti, which had been held since the time of Pratap Malla. Kerung also remained with the Tibetans, leaving Rasuwa as Nepal’s only retained border in that region.
In his book Bhkshu, Byapar ra Bidroh, journalist Sudheer Sharma illustrates the historical reality of China’s nuanced geopolitical posture toward Nepal. He cites a revealing excerpt from A Brief History of Modern China, a Beijing-published government book, which released a map in 1954 listing Nepal and a few other countries as “old dependent states of China that were snatched away by British imperialism” (pg. 150).
Nepal has had to bear the consequences of China’s growing geopolitical ambition, particularly after Beijing established control over Tibet. With China now firmly established as Nepal’s northern neighbor, the burden of its geopolitical maneuvering continues to fall on Nepal.
Given this, Nepal must reassess China’s current stance on the LLK region. The global political landscape is currently in flux. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine shows no signs of resolution, while Israel remains in a constant state of military alert amid long-term security concerns in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, the U.S. President’s efforts to reshape global trade using tariff-driven policies under the Make America Great Again (MAGA) campaign have added a degree of warmth to otherwise tense China–India relations.
Though the risk of Nepal being caught in the crossfire of major power rivalries — especially those controlling global trade and supply chains — may not be permanent, it is a real and persistent concern.
Historically, citing threats from China, Indian soldiers were stationed at 18 checkpoints in Nepal’s Himalayan region during the later years of the Rana regime. In today’s republic-era Nepal, however, such actions are unimaginable. Nepal formally asserted its claim to the LLK region through a constitutional amendment in 2020, after India began road construction in the disputed area.
Nepal must remain vigilant amid these developments. To do so effectively, Parliament must engage in a comprehensive debate on major strategic projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Even if delayed, a full parliamentary discussion on the BRI is both necessary and overdue.
Yet, even at that time, there was no long-term breakdown in Kathmandu-Delhi political ties. More recently, after China and India agreed to conduct trade via the Lipulekh Pass, both Nepal and India reiterated their commitment to resolving the issue through diplomatic channels.
Efforts to elevate India–Nepal relations from a historical and cultural footing to a strictly “geostrategic” level could inadvertently weaken their foundational ties. In the current unstable geopolitical climate, it is essential to ease Nepal’s growing strategic burden by fostering conditions for meaningful diplomatic dialogue between India and Nepal regarding the LLK dispute.
Such a conversation should ideally be held in Nepal’s sovereign parliament, especially now that China has publicly stated that Nepal supports its Global Security Initiative (GSI). Much of today’s global unrest stems from competing economic and strategic interests.
Nepal must remain vigilant amid these developments. To do so effectively, Parliament must engage in a comprehensive debate on major strategic projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Even if delayed, a full parliamentary discussion on the BRI is both necessary and overdue.
(Views expressed in this opinion are the writer’s and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Khabarhub)
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