Sectarianism continues to be a deeply entrenched issue within Pakistan’s religious and ideological landscape, shaped by both internal policies and external influences, especially the rivalries in the Middle East.
Sectarian violence in Pakistan primarily involves conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslim communities.
This violence has deep historical roots but has intensified in recent decades due to various factors, including political changes, external influences, and the rise of religious extremism.
Conflict between religious sects in Pakistan has been omnipresent throughout the country’s history but was exacerbated during the era of General Zia-ul-Haq, which coincided with the Cold War and the Iranian revolution, both of which played pivotal roles in emphasizing the sectarian identities of Pakistanis, mainly between Shias and Sunnis.
The demographic composition, political polarization, terrorism, and weak writ of the government especially exacerbate sectarian violence in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was a secular Shi’a lawyer who demanded a separate homeland for India’s Muslims that he said would not be a theocracy. And Pakistan started out on a non-sectarian track.
The 2015 “National Action Plan (NAP) for Countering Terrorism and Extremism” aimed to curb sectarian violence and religious persecution and intolerance, but a decade later, its results have been mixed.
Over the years, however, Pakistan has become a major center of Islamist extremism. A 1974 amendment to Pakistan’s constitution declared the Ahmadis (followers of the Ahmadiyya sect) non-Muslims.
Subsequent legislation forbade them from describing themselves as Muslim or from publicly using Muslim terminology or religious symbols even when their religion required them to do so.
Religious minorities, such as Hindus and Christians, complain of discrimination and have periodically been subjected to violent attacks by extremists.
The disproportionate influence wielded by fundamentalist groups in Pakistan is the result of the state sponsorship of such groups.
So crucial have the sectarian affiliations become that in 2004, in a sign that times had changed, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz found himself compelled to declare publicly “I am a Sunni Muslim” to counter rumors that he was an Ahmadi.
Jinnah’s successors relied even more on Islam as a national unifier, and the process of casting Pakistan as an Islamic ideological state intensified further under the military rule that began in 1958.
Ziaul Haq’s Islamization empowered the Sunni clergy and antagonized the country’s Shi’a minority.
The Afghan jihad resulted in the free flow of arms and military training for Sunni Islamists. Soon, some of these Sunni militants were attacking the Shi’a in an effort to purify Pakistan of their “heterodoxy.”
Since then thousands have been killed, and thousands more maimed, in attacks by zealots of the rival sects in Pakistan.
Although Pakistan’s census does not track sectarian affiliation, government reports estimate that the population is roughly 58 percent Sunni (primarily Deobandi) and 42 percent Shia.
Recent clashes in regions like Kurram district have resulted in significant casualties and humanitarian crises. Kurram is one of the seven former tribal districts of Pakistan that border Afghanistan.
It has a unique demographic composition, with a significant Shia population.
On 12 October, clashes between Shias and Sunnis in the Kurram district of Pakistan’s northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa resulted in the deaths of 16 people, including three women and two children.
The violence flared up on November 21, 2024, when gunmen ambushed a convoy of vehicles, killing 52 people, mostly Shiite Muslims.
With escalating attacks, most of Khurram’s 800,000 residents remain cut off from essential supplies, trapped by a blockade that isolated entire communities.
Paramilitary convoys attempting to guard passengers were ambushed. Families inside Kurram find themselves trapped, unable to escape — those outside stranded, with no safe way home.
Bloodshed in Kurram is less about infighting between the ‘two groups’ and more about what the locals describe as the ‘hidden hand’, by which they mean – state-supported operatives — ‘inflaming’ and ‘manipulating’ the distrust between them.
Evidence suggests sectarian animosity is spreading into larger parts of the Sunni Islamist milieu.
In previous decades, Deobandi Sunni groups, particularly Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its offshoot Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, instigated much of the violence.
For Pakistan the struggle against sectarianism remains a formidable challenge, demanding consistent policy efforts and a strategic shift to address the ideological forces that sustain groups like TLP and foster religious persecution.
The 2015 “National Action Plan (NAP) for Countering Terrorism and Extremism” aimed to curb sectarian violence and religious persecution and intolerance, but a decade later, its results have been mixed.
Consider the case of Sunni sectarian outfit Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) resurfacing after it was originally banned in 2002, as Millat-i-Islamia Pakistan in 2003 and then again it rebranded itself as the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat in 2012 (which was also banned). Despite repeated bans, the group remains active and even contests elections under the Pakistan Rah-i-Haq Party.
Two distinct new forces, the Salafi Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) – the local Islamic State branch – and Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (Labaik, for short) – a hardline political party and violent protest movement whose followers come mostly from Pakistan’s Barelvi Sunni majority – have now taken the lead, reconfiguring the nature of the threat.
The rise of Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) after NAP came into force raises critical questions about the plan’s effectiveness and introduces a new set of challenges. Initially bolstered by elements within the state and politicians seeking narrow political and strategic advantages, TLP’s emergence has revealed Pakistan’s vulnerability to ultra-conservative politico-religious groups.
Despite facing temporary bans and restrictions, TLP has grown into a powerful force in both the political and religious spheres.
The group taps into its broad support base and leverages public sentiment, especially surrounding blasphemy issues, to influence policy and social discourse.
For Pakistan the struggle against sectarianism remains a formidable challenge, demanding consistent policy efforts and a strategic shift to address the ideological forces that sustain groups like TLP and foster religious persecution.
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