With the competition between China and the US, “defense diplomacy” has witnessed a distinct setup and prioritized accordingly — domestically, regionally and internationally.
“Diplomacy in Defence” or “Defence in Diplomacy” signifies numerous possessions to nation states’ super, great, middle, small, or regional powers’ strategic national interests.
It may also connote unsymmetrical to the traditional understanding of defense diplomacy arrangements through the exchange in educational arrangements or the presence of representatives of forces in different diplomatic or other missions.
The trend of defense diplomacy is changing its discourse with: one, militarization with the risk of war; two, joint forces military exercises like anti-terrorism measures, Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief operations; and third, the substituting of International Organisation’s foundation from a humanitarian and economic setup to defense cooperation.
Diplomacy for ‘peace or against peace’
This is defense diplomacy for development but with political corruption, political comfort and image-building with questions. For instance, the Korean People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and other armies adhering to political space is one of the examples of this.
In addition, defense diplomacy is ‘for or against democracy’. Afghanistan and Myanmar in South Asia, and DPRK in East Asia are examples. Here, the big powers’ political and economic interests prevail.
The fundamental principles of the establishment are being questioned with unidentified bilateral and multilateral, regional and international challenges.
The international organization of Asia supports an all-inclusive doctrine on managing China and the US with a “comprehensive long-term security strategy” and a strategic structure along the way.
South and Southeast Asians must articulate their policies on balancing the global, emerging, and rising power that is vital for regional and international stability and prosperity.
The foreign policy now should tune for the century that is arriving not the century that has already gone.
Let’s take the example of Cold War 2.0, which can be felt lately. The new realities are there to stay in all doors. Together with the innovation of a new system of military hardware, it is the politics and long-term political-security interests for a safer Asia.
As per Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the total global military expenditure increased by 0.7 percent in real terms in 2021, to reach 2113 billion US$.
The five largest spenders in 2021 were the United States, China, India, the United Kingdom and Russia, together accounting for the US is 64.5 percent or 782 billion US$ more than the next four China, Russia, India and Germany put together even with the second year of a pandemic the military expenditure reaches record level.
World military spending continued to grow in 2023, reaching an all-time high of 2.1 trillion US$.
This was the seventh consecutive year that spending increased. The top five also hold 51 percent of the global economy.
South Asia and Southeast Asia is a region with the highest boots on the ground, as per the global firepower of the 11-military strength ranking, five are in Asia (China, India, Japan, Pakistan and South Korea) five are from Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, UK) and the global power the US from North America.
All the powers are in the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and South Korea with territorial possession as well as disputes in the Himalayas and the South China Sea.
France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US is stimulating and motivational presence for their geostrategic interests. Of the eight nations that announced nuclear detonation seven are in the region.
South Asia currently numbers almost 5 million (approx. 4 million and 92 thousand) from 3.8 million in 1995.
Military expenditure was 16.22 billion US$ in 1998 to 95.07 billion US$ in 2021 in addition to an average of 2.6 percent of the GDP.
Pakistan and India, as opponents, and China and India as contestants saw several confrontations. Given this number and capability, it is even more important that security and defense matters are understood from a rather higher vantage point.
Southeast Asia spent 34.5 billion US$ on defense in 2019, a 4.2 percent increase from 2018.
But SIPRI’s 2019 numbers didn’t include full data for Myanmar or Vietnam, which adds at least 8 billion US$.
Singapore topped regional defense spending at 11.2 billion US$, followed by Indonesia at 7 billion US$, Thailand at 7.3 billion US$, Malaysia at 3.8 billion US$, and the Philippines at 3.5 billion US$.
Military build-up has been the trend of modernization to expand military effectiveness since 1975 with the end of the Vietnam War.
Modernization expanded after the 1997 Asian financial crisis — the biggest increase compared to other regions of the world.
It has been endorsed for safeguarding economic interest, self-assurance in lessening extra-regional powers’ presence, domestic and foreign anxieties in addition national prestige.
According to the Global Times of March 2022, China is to boost the country’s defined budget by 7.1 percent, to a total of 230 billion US$ in 2022, with analysts claiming that the proposed budget growth is steady and reasonable at a time when China needs to modernize its military capabilities to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity amid severe external threats and an unstable security environment.
India’s military spending of 76.6 billion US$ ranked third highest in the world.
This was up by 0.9 percent from 2020 and by 33 percent from 2012.
In a push to strengthen the indigenous arms industry, 64 percent of capital outlays in the military budget of 2021 were earmarked for acquisitions of domestically produced arms.
Similarly, Pakistan holds 49 percent, Bangladesh 13 percent and Myanmar 11 percent of the Chinese weapon system, all countries bordering India. Era is altering, opportunities knocking and challenges unsympathetically volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.
Trends in South Asia security architecture are shifting for a new South Asian order.
Nepal and the Region
Nepal is a small landlocked country finding space may it be political economy and political-security is squeezed between or embraced by the emerging power China to the north of the Himalayas and rising power India to the east, west, and south.
The founding father of Nepal King Prithvi Narayan Shah said “Nepal is a yam between two boulders” in 1768.
Moving through a different period in history recognized as a buffer zone during the British Raj to contain and control the spread of communism when China was expanding. Geographic challenges south of the Himalayas persisted.
By contemporary hypothesis, it is a buffer to both the immediate neighbors as geography is assessable and geography has changed its dimensions.
Geography is no more physical and additionally political interests with the advancement of technology including Artificial Intelligence.
The geographic challenge south of the Himalayas persisted and will continue to persist with more essence.
The argument over the period with so much transformation is “Is Nepal a bridge, a buffer, or still a yam?” The argument moves on even saying that it is not the two Asian powers China and India but also the global power the US making it three boulders.
Nepal is not just a nation-state feeling the geopolitical heat of the buffer, bridge, or yam conception but it is to all the Asian nations.
It is an issue of bilateral, trilateral and multilateralism depending on where in the geography you are positioned.
The challenges posed by the rise of spending in defense and modernization, and geopolitical factors should not champion the policy of ‘Exclusion’ to shift the geostrategic surroundings. To be candid, the trend of militarization is ongoing and thoughts of strategic balancing are unending in the region with Asian centrality.
As the Himalayas are one part of the upcoming geopolitical flux, centrality comparatively is maritime.
The Pacific and the Indian Ocean have been a playground. 14 nations in and around China are being reinvigorated with political influence, economic assistance and diplomatic aggressive engagements in defense by the competitors — China and the US.
Domestic and regional consensus with a common ideological belief that annotatability is tomorrow’s destiny.
Five strategic appraisals
Strategic balancing with strategic autonomy with both the rivals China and the US with “Free, Open and Engaged Indo-Pacific Region (FOEIPR) to establish rule-based international order and consolidate principles of free trade, freedom of navigation and the rule of law all considerate for stability and prosperity of the IPR.
The international organization of Asia supports an all-inclusive doctrine on managing China and the US with a “comprehensive long-term security strategy” and a strategic structure along the way.
Economic interdependence strategy to be acted upon. In 2000, the US trade with the ASEAN countries was 135 billion US$. China and the US were 40 billion US$.
The US was three and half times larger but today ASEAN and US went up to 300 billion US$. China and ASEAN have gone up by 20 times more to 800 billion US$.
BIMSTEC and ASEAN cooperation with military engagements as measures of defense diplomacy. BIMSTEC and ASEAN need to stand encompassing liberalism and the policy of ‘Inclusion’ not ‘Exclusion’ as a strength and defense diplomacy as the means to bring along all on board like Afghanistan, Myanmar and DPRK as a component of Asian centrality.
But the common constituent and interest have one apprehension “a peaceful environment with embraced liberal economic growth, an inclusive region with domestic political stability and strategic balance and less strategic autonomy with strategic management”.
Exercise Garuda Shield started in 2009 is a US and Indonesia joint military exercise held annually, turned ‘Super Garuda’ in 2022 after 14 countries with first-time participants Australia, Japan, and Singapore, and returning participants Canada, France, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the United Kingdom.
The challenges posed by the rise of spending in defense and modernization, and geopolitical factors should not champion the policy of ‘Exclusion’ to shift the geostrategic surroundings. To be candid, the trend of militarization is ongoing and thoughts of strategic balancing are unending in the region with Asian centrality.
Defence Diplomacy for Peace and against Peace
Two choices exist: “Diplomacy for peace or diplomacy against peace”.
When the world powers are administering a new world order, Asia is finding a space for a new normal.
The traditional forms of defense diplomacy are being challenged with broadly three natures or environments of diplomacy that defense forces undertake.
First, defense forces contend for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and support national interests but diplomacy is equally important for the endorsement that needs to emerge with backing from the day-to-day administration for the modernization of the forces.
The establishment requires efficient diplomacy for a force to perform with efficiency to protect and defend their nation-state.
Diplomacy amongst different arms and services and civil-military relationships is similarly imperative as to the diplomacy amongst the defenders of national interests. This is ‘internal in configuration’ but ‘domestic diplomacy in character’.
Second, joint military exercises bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, multilateral, or as part of the International Organization is apparent.
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) involvement in a joint exercise with other powers and more significant.
The BIMSTEC Alliance Joint Military Exercise started in 2018.
China and Russia have been leading the military exercises since 2005 and have held 12 drills together including Eight joint sea series naval drills.
ASEAN is participating with all powers present in the IPR. China, European, Japan, Russia, and the US more focused on the maritime domain.
“La Perouse 21” with Australia, France, Japan, India, and the US Multilateral Exercise is an example.
During August 2022, Southeast Asia saw abundant defense diplomatic activities with 26 countries Rim of Pacific or RIMPAC 2022 naval exercise co-hosted by the US Navy.
Exercise Garuda Shield started in 2009 is a US and Indonesia joint military exercise held annually, turned ‘Super Garuda’ in 2022 after 14 countries with first-time participants Australia, Japan, and Singapore, and returning participants Canada, France, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the United Kingdom.
Similarly, ASEAN and China navies, including the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) maritime exercise, are conducted.
Thailand is irreplaceable among the ASEAN, simultaneously deepening military ties with both China and the US.
Thailand holds three percent of the Chinese weapon system, which does not have a strategic interest but questioning strategic engagement.
Pakistan has 49 percent, Bangladesh 13 percent, and Myanmar 11 percent of Chinese defense hardware all immediate neighbors of India.
SCO which covers three-fifths of Eurasia with half of the world’s population is a political, economic and military organization to maintain peace, security and stability in the Eurasian region and also a non-western organization with three strong members China, India, and Russia abstained in the UNSC voting against Russian aggression.
SCO determination is growing and expanded over the years.
The November 2005 summit in Astana, Kazakhstan standout in its perception, it rejected the US observer status, and became an observer in the United Nations General Assembly, with representatives from South Asia nations India and Pakistan, Iran, from the Persian Gulf and Mongolia from North Central Asia, attended for the first time.
India and Pakistan’s entry in 2017 was the start of expanding interests in South Asia.
The aims and purposes of ASEAN were to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development. SCO’s charter was signed in 2002 with economic and political cooperation.
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) has established relations with the African Union’s African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).
Belarus and Iran are likely to be members. Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are set to be given SCO Dialogue Partner status.
Chinese President Xi’s visit to Saudi Arabia has implications for an expansion into the Persian Gulf.
ASEAN, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Turkmenistan and the UN are guest attendees.
Besides bilateral and multilateral relationships China and Russia are linked with influential intergovernmental groups.
China and Russia have been leading the military exercises since 2005 and have held 12 drills together including Eight joint sea series naval drills.
‘Zbigniew Brzezinski’s theory elucidates that “control of the Eurasian landmass is the key to global domination and control of Central Asia is the key to control of the Eurasian landmass”.
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated that “SCO is working to establish a rational and just world order and provides a unique opportunity to take part in the process of forming a fundamentally new model of geopolitical integration”.
SCO which covers three-fifths of Eurasia with half of the world’s population is a political, economic and military organization to maintain peace, security and stability in the Eurasian region and also a non-western organization with three strong members China, India and Russia abstained in the United Nations Security Council voting against Russian aggression.
Matthew Brummer in the Journal of International Affairs in 2007 traces the effect of SCO opening out in the Persian Gulf as an alternative for energy and resources trade.
Political scientist Thomas Ambrosio in Europe-Asia Studies Volume 60, 2008 – Issue 8 says that one of the aims is to ensure that liberal democracies could not gain ground.
The SCO has also been argued of being the alliance of the east and to counter North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
Established in 1997, BIMSTEC had 14 objectives along with technological and economic cooperation.
Undertaking development efforts by military forces is perceived as a contribution to national development and a diplomatic attempt to assist friendly militaries and nations to develop particular infrastructure.
The aims and purposes of ASEAN were to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development. SCO’s charter was signed in 2002 with economic and political cooperation.
Warsaw and NATO
The other is the formation of the Warsaw Pact established in 1955 with the induction of West Germany into NATO, but both were the expansion of military forces for a collective defense during the Cold War.
Warsaw was signed between the Soviet Union and the Seven Eastern Bloc socialist republics of Central and Eastern Europe.
NATO, a 30-member intergovernmental military alliance, was formed after World War -II in 1949 and is involved at present in military operations in South Asia and Southeast Asia.
The alliances were involved in the containment of each other in Europe to support strategic policies and can be argued that, YES, the organizations assisted in preventing the full-scale war with fear of each other’s capabilities and the damage that could create to humanity with the question “will such arrangements happen in Asia”?
The Cold War era was different, it was more ideological with insubstantial economic circumstance, two, it was in a different continent, and policies that most Asians inculcated was non-alignment.
But one thing common is the presence of International Organisations and the swing to embrace needs with trends of threat.
Europe had the Warsaw pact and democracies had NATO. Warsaw pact collapsed and NATO is shifting to IPR.
But the realism is “Are South Asian and Southeast Asian prepared to take sides in the power rivalry”.
Now the second choice is “Diplomacy for Peace” which requires defence forces for international peace commitments, but the difference is, it follows conflict to prevent further regional and international uncertainty.
The UN training centers are upcoming with multinational joint military exercises.
For example, Nepali Army’s defense diplomacy ties are to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity not only in their home country but also abroad, largely in countries such as India, and the UK and as part of the United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Diplomacy amongst different arms as well as civil-military relationships is symmetrically important to the diplomacy amongst the defenders of national interests with divergent defense capabilities in the altering geostrategic environment.
Therefore, the trends in the domestic security environment, trends in regionalism, and trends of internationalism — three categories of defense diplomacy — exist as a confidence-building measure.
These can go on but the point is the altering arrangement of defense diplomacy, diplomacy that could turn against peace, and diplomacy which will shape to prevent hostility when competitive militarization is underway.
With the risk of war defense diplomacy being an opportunity, these again are “Defence Diplomacy: Reshaping Geopolitics in Asia.”
Defense diplomacy for Development
Undertaking development efforts by military forces is perceived as a contribution to national development and a diplomatic attempt to assist friendly militaries and nations to develop particular infrastructure.
Militaries for political space to enhance their image as well as the regime they support, in addition, political corruption and political comfort are linked to defense forces embarking on development efforts though some argue their constitutional obligation.
Defense diplomacy in for democracy or defense diplomacy against democracy
Afghanistan and Myanmar are under military rule and Thailand now and then comes under military apprehension of power.
Taliban takeover of Afghanistan occurred with the US and Allied forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan.
With numerous attempts for the restoration of democracy from ASEAN and other regional powers, Myanmar is still under seize.
Great power’s strategic interest may be political or economic indirectly assists the military rulers in control questioning the very fundamentals of democracy.
Conclusion
Therefore, the trends in the domestic security environment, trends in regionalism, and trends of internationalism — three categories of defense diplomacy — exist as a confidence-building measure.
One: Domestic with a budget and inter-service engagement; two: regionals with International Organisation as the platform with the expansion of bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, and multilateral; and three: International diplomacy for peace, when nations are involved as part of their foreign policy to be part of the UN for international peace.
Fourth is defense diplomacy in politics and defense diplomacy for development for political and economic gains.
(Binoj Basnyat is a Security Analyst, Maj Gen (Retd.) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand)
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