Sri Lanka’s political landscape has undergone a significant transformation with the recent election of Anura Kumara Dissanayake as its new president.
The 55-year-old leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a Marxist-leaning party, ascended to power on promises of rooting out corruption, addressing the country’s severe economic challenges, and giving a voice to the Sri Lankan masses.
His election comes at a crucial time for Sri Lanka, as the nation continues to grapple with the fallout from its worst fiscal crisis in decades.
The collapse, brought on by weak exports, mounting debt, and poor governance, has forced the country to seek external financial assistance from all corners.
However, the greatest concern in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under Dissanayake may not just be economic recovery, but how it navigates its increasingly complex relationship with China.
Sri Lanka was one of the first countries to sign on to the BRI, with billions in loans pouring into the construction of highways, the Colombo Port City, and other infrastructure projects.
Under the stewardship of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China has grown its influence in Sri Lanka over the last decade, often cloaked in the garb of economic aid and infrastructure development.
For Sri Lanka, this association comes with significant risks, not the least of which is falling further into China’s notorious debt trap diplomacy.
China’s engagement with Sri Lanka reached its zenith during the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa, during which the Chinese government poured billions of dollars into infrastructure projects, many of them now considered “white elephants.”
These projects were funded through loans that Sri Lanka had little capacity to repay. The Hambantota Port, one of the most infamous examples, stands as a glaring symbol of China’s debt trap diplomacy.
Built with Chinese loans, the port proved unprofitable, and Sri Lanka was forced to lease it to China for 99 years after failing to service its debt.
This transaction, finalized in 2019, handed Beijing control over a strategic asset on one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.
The concept of debt trap diplomacy is simple but devastating: China extends loans to developing countries, typically for large infrastructure projects.
When these nations are unable to repay the loans—often because the projects are economically unviable—Beijing seizes control of the assets built with Chinese money.
The strategy serves dual purposes for the CCP: it allows China to extend its political and economic influence while trapping vulnerable nations into long-term dependency.
Sri Lanka, with its $51 billion external debt, owes nearly 11 percent to China, making it one of the most indebted countries to the Asian superpower.
Despite the warnings and growing criticism of China’s predatory lending practices, Sri Lanka remains inextricably tied to Beijing.
The controversial Hambantota deal demonstrates how the CCP uses financial leverage to gain strategic control over sovereign nations.
China’s investment is not about mutual benefit or development—it’s about control. The CCP sees Sri Lanka not as a partner but as a pawn in its broader geopolitical game, which aims to project Chinese influence across the Indian Ocean and beyond.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature foreign policy project, has been another instrument through which the CCP has expanded its influence in Sri Lanka.
Envisioned as a modern-day Silk Road, the BRI has led to Chinese investments in infrastructure projects across the globe, including ports, highways, and rail roads.
While the initiative has been framed as a development program, many countries that have participated have found themselves struggling under insurmountable debt, with China gaining significant control over critical national assets.
Many of the infrastructure projects funded by Chinese loans have been built by Chinese firms using Chinese labor, which means that very little of the money actually stays in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka was one of the first countries to sign on to the BRI, with billions in loans pouring into the construction of highways, the Colombo Port City, and other infrastructure projects.
However, many of these projects have been criticized for being economically unsustainable, and their benefits to the local population have been limited.
The Hambantota Port, for instance, was built far from major trade routes, making it unprofitable from the start.
Under Dissanayake’s presidency, there are concerns that Sri Lanka may once again fall prey to China’s BRI projects.
President Xi Jinping was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Dissanayake on his victory, and he pledged further cooperation between their countries under the BRI framework.
The CCP has historically strengthened its engagement with Sri Lanka whenever left-leaning or socialist governments are in power, providing more loans, aid, and political support.
As Dissanayake navigates Sri Lanka’s recovery, the temptation to seek additional Chinese financing for infrastructure development will be strong, but it could further deepen Sri Lanka’s dependency on Beijing.
While many observers might see China’s involvement in Sri Lanka as purely economic, it’s important to understand the larger geopolitical ambitions at play.
Sri Lanka’s location on one of the world’s busiest maritime routes makes it a strategic prize for Beijing, particularly as China seeks to expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
By gaining control of critical infrastructure like Hambantota Port, China can project its military and economic power far beyond its borders.
This is not a new strategy for China, which has used similar tactics to gain influence across Africa, Southeast Asia, and even Europe.
In each case, the CCP extends financial aid with one hand while quietly undermining the sovereignty of its so-called partners with the other.
In Sri Lanka, China has already secured long-term control over critical assets, and its influence only seems poised to grow under Dissanayake’s administration.
It’s important to recognize that, despite the vast sums of money China has invested in Sri Lanka, the benefits to the local economy have been minimal.
China’s track record in Sri Lanka should serve as a warning. The CCP’s promises of prosperity often come with strings attached, and once those strings are pulled, they are almost impossible to break.
Many of the infrastructure projects funded by Chinese loans have been built by Chinese firms using Chinese labor, which means that very little of the money actually stays in Sri Lanka.
Moreover, many of these projects—like the Hambantota Port—have proven to be economically unviable, providing little to no return on investment for Sri Lanka.
China’s promises of development and prosperity often ring hollow. What the CCP offers is not a path to sustainable growth but a road to dependency.
By saddling countries like Sri Lanka with unpayable debt, China ensures that they remain beholden to Beijing for decades to come.
The CCP’s strategy is not about fostering mutual growth or development—it’s about control, pure and simple.
As Sri Lanka embarks on this new chapter under President Dissanayake, the country faces a stark choice.
It can continue to engage with China, allowing itself to be drawn deeper into Beijing’s web of debt and dependency, or it can seek a path that prioritizes its sovereignty and long-term economic health.
China’s track record in Sri Lanka should serve as a warning. The CCP’s promises of prosperity often come with strings attached, and once those strings are pulled, they are almost impossible to break.
For Sri Lanka, the road ahead is fraught with challenges. But if there’s one lesson to be learned from the past decade, it’s that China’s version of “help” often comes at too high a price.
The future of Sri Lanka depends on its ability to navigate this relationship carefully, avoiding the traps that have ensnared so many other nations under the guise of Chinese aid and investment.
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