State fragility and organized crime (II)

Post-conflict Nepal after 1996 till date can be taken as the best harvesting session for national and international Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) and Transnational Organized Crime Groups (TOCGs) in Nepal. Since the beginning of the armed conflict in 1996, the competency and efficiency of Nepal Police were irreparably damaged. Before that, Nepal Police was a credible investigating and law enforcement agency. But since the armed conflict after 1996, its mandate, power, and authority were curtailed and negotiated by the government and the irregular forces by creating new departments like the Department of Immigration, Department of Money Laundering and the Department of Transport and Licensing Department.

These departments, in the present context, have become a liability than an asset to the government. They have not been fully functional and active to investigate, contain and control organized and financial as they are supposed to do. At this juncture, the former, assertive role of Nepal Police and Armed Police were limited to reactive and more of protective services that gave full play of serious and organized crimes.

The overriding comprehensive power and authority of Nepal Police were disintegrated by the formation of new departments mentioned above. It disintegrated police jurisdiction and mandate on one hand, but it gave much more leverage for the OCGs to play around one against the other. The problem with these new departments was their lack of expertise, expertise, and strength that was unmatched to deal with the OCGs.

For example, organized crimes, transnational crimes, and money laundering demand overriding authority, power, and strong law enforcement capability, which these departments do not possess. Similarly, law enforcement of crime and the financial investigation is complementary and inseparable. The investigation of money laundering has been assigned to a different set of government servants who have not been able to come with any substantial result in money laundering cases which is the other side of a coin of organized and transnational crime.

All these new arrangements gave space to the novo-rich and adventurism that gave way to more gray areas in society. Since the beginning of the armed conflict initiated by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN (M), Nepal Police started to lose its power and man on the onslaught of the Maoist guerillas. Consequently, Nepal Police became the first victim for it was not prepared for the armed confrontation it had faced during the insurgency period. On the other hand, CPM (M) started to behave like an irregular group with all tactics to gain power and money.

It gave way to various armed criminal activities like bank robbery, kidnapping, summary execution, extortion to forcible land usurpation. In the year 2006, the Comprehensive Peace Treaty (CPA) recognized the People Liberation Army of the CPN (M) and their sister organization Young Communist League (YCL), UNMIN took the responsibility to management of the cantonments and reintegrate the Maoist combatants. At this time, Nepalese security apparatuses had more or less role to play by appeasing the rebel group, factional contradicting political parties. This situation somehow gave full opportunity for illegal, criminal national foreign elements to all activities: legal, semi-legal and sometimes even illegal. In a way, it gave way to impunity and lawlessness to a larger extent.

Organized Crime

What is an organized crime and how do the organized criminals look like? This is a common question that is colored by the films and media stories where most of the criminal bosses and kingpin become the role model for an ambitious risk-taking young Nepali who may see and admire them as a hero ―sitting behind marble desks, wearing expensive suits, with their ties done up to 11 o’ clock”. But, they tend to forget that, their role model, wearing an expensive suit with their ties done up to 11 o‘clock may be a syndicate leader, and boss of the organized syndicate, who may steal their cash!

Some of the crucial features of organized crime are fear, intimidation, and violence. Their prime motive focuses merely on to gain power, earn money, and demand respect by conspiracy, coercion, and corruption, or whatever means. OCGs love to take the unwarranted risk, financial misrepresentation, money laundering, engaging in white-collar crime and fraudulent acts.

Comparatively, there might be less violence in organized crime in Nepal compared to Mexico, Colombia, and Afghanistan; because the stage of OCGs in Nepal is still in its infantile stage. It is a common fact that the objective of all criminals whether organized or less organized, white collar or blue collar, one the major motivating factor is money and profit. It is also true that crime of any type will have a lot to do with illegal, unethical and nefarious activities that are prohibited by law.

Some cases amounting to 0rganized crime in Nepal

In the fiscal year 2016/17, the government of Nepal spent Rs. 204 billion in capital expenditure in infrastructure projects, out of which it paid its 10 percent (about 20 billion) in bribes and commissions to civil servants, engineers, department heads, secretaries and ministers (Pangeni, 2017). A former president of the Federation of Contractors‘ Association confesses that―percent is an open secret and practiced in almost all public procurements. In this regard, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Procurement and IT says ―the commission is not to be reflected on paperwork and cannot be talked about.

That means that engineers of roads and bridges receive Rs. 2.5 million and Rs. 15 million from a contract worth 500 million. These commissions are shared by an entire system ranging from the junior staffers to officers (60 percent) to ministers (40 percent), and those unable to satisfy ministers and politicians get transferred. In these transactions, top brass and political parties themselves collect commissions if the contract is too big, worth billions of rupees‘. Despite police warning, such corrupt and ill-gotten money get distributed onto gang leaders and ringleaders who get around 2 percent, Treasury Controller Office seeks up to 0.2 percent, and Auditor‘s Office also gets 0.2 percent.

(To be continued)