These days, various programs are being organized to mark the 105th founding anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). When the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 under Chen Duxiu’s leadership, Mao Zedong was one of its founding members.
In 1949, Mao led the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). On October 1, 1949, Mao announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the CCP won the Chinese Civil War under his leadership. China’s economy has become the second largest in the world. By showcasing its economic advancements, China hopes to increase its worldwide influence.
In Nepal as well, the CCP’s 105th founding anniversary is being celebrated and commemorated. Xi’s ideology is being promoted rhetorically. In an open democratic state like Nepal, is the Chinese prescription with Xi philosophy acceptable? How does China want to present itself in Nepal? This article focuses on these basic questions.
Leadership and War History
China has a long and complex history with Nepal. While diplomatic relations between modern China and Nepal appear strong today, there was a time when Chinese emperors attempted to invade Kathmandu. Before Tibet came under Chinese control, relations between China and Nepal were frequently tense.
At the National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party adopted Xi’s philosophy as “Xi Jinpingism” and made it its tenet. At the Chinese Communist Party’s Ninth National Congress, it was determined to spread “Xi Jinpingism” outside China.
History shows that after several rounds of negotiations, Nepal and China signed the Treaty of Betrawati in 1792 to end the conflict. Nepal lost the privileges granted under the Kerung Agreement, which had allowed it to collect annual payments from Tibet. In contrast, under the new treaty, Nepal was required to send quinquennial tribute missions—ceremonial gifts every five years—and acknowledge the Qing Emperor’s suzerainty over Nepal. In return, the Qing dynasty agreed to provide military protection to Nepal against external threats.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, there has been a historical trend of CCP leaders, from Mao to Deng Xiaoping, starting wars with various countries to maintain their grip on domestic politics.
For example, in 1969, due to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which Mao had started in August 1966 as a means of regaining his political dominance following the failure of his “Great Leap Forward” economic program in the early 1960s, Mao faced significant challenges in 1967–1968.
By mid-1967, the Cultural Revolution had turned into a full-fledged civil war that caused widespread disruptions to law and order and economic activity. As a result, “revolutionary” factions engaged in hand-to-hand combat in several cities. Mao demanded in November 1968 that the Cultural Revolution be terminated by the summer of 1969.
He believed it would stop the public unrest and bring the Communist Party back under his control. On the eve of the Party Congress, Mao believed that the pretext of a serious external threat presented by a border war with the Soviet Union might be useful. Historians claim that the Chinese employed a “time-honored” tactic of dramatizing foreign events for local interests.
Similarly, to maintain his legacy, Mao appointed Hua Guofeng, a relative lightweight, as his successor prior to his death in September 1976. Deng Xiaoping was chosen to lead the PRC by those who had survived the Cultural Revolution despite suffering significant political and personal setbacks and wanted to start over.
The Eleventh Party Congress recognized Hua as China’s top leader in August 1977. However, it became evident by early 1978 that Deng was putting up a significant political fight against the Maoists.
Deng and Hua engaged in a do-or-die political struggle for dominance between September and November 1978, as the Vietnam War situation was intensifying and reached a boiling point. In such circumstances, it suited Deng to have an external “threat” to mobilize the Communist Party behind his cause, just as Mao had previously done.
Regarding China’s progress and quiet approach, Deng stated when he came to power, “Hide your strength and bide your time,” and this saying eventually came to be considered the guiding principle of China’s foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s, focusing on China’s development and avoiding provoking other world powers.
After Deng’s leadership, the CCP has not fought a direct war with any country. However, according to Vijay Gokhale, author of the book China’s Wars: The Politics and Diplomacy Behind Its Military Coercion, “although China hasn’t engaged in combat since 1979, it has nevertheless used military force in circumstances other than full-scale conflicts. Simply put, its coercive behavior has shifted from outright starting conflicts to what is known as ‘grey-zone warfare of coercion.'”
Ideological Inconsistency
Vince Cable, in his book Eclipsing the West, has elaborated: “In an effort to balance the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Deng with the desirability of rising Chinese capitalism, Jiang Zemin developed the Three Represents in 2000. But this left idealistic party insiders feeling confused and disillusioned.
Hu Jintao, Jiang’s successor, did not fare any better with his Scientific Outlook on Development—just another piece of cryptic rhetoric attempting to defend a mixed economy in terms that sounded Marxist.
Furthermore, it separated conservatives who were concerned that the party was already losing too much power from reformers who wished to continue with a more liberalized political system. This ambiguity and lack of ideological coherence were passed down to Xi.
‘Government, the military, society and schools, north, south, east, and west—the party leads them all.’
He was committed to re-establishing the party’s primacy and its hold on power. However, it was still unclear what the party stood for.
The “Seven Nos” were the first hint of Xi’s opposition. He opposed neo-liberalism, a free press, civil society, universal ideals, constitutional democracy, historical nihilism, and the role of socialism. Cable added, “Xi has shown the benefits and drawbacks of consolidating power in his own hands since assuming power in 2013.
By extending his own tenure beyond ten years and ending the succession policy introduced by Deng, he underlined his own authority but created major uncertainty over what will happen when he passes away, becomes incapacitated, or is forced out.”
He declared the centenary objective: by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC’s formation, China must become a “major world power with pioneering global influence.” There was some discussion of holding office bearers accountable through more public “intra-party” debate during President Hu’s tenure (2004–2014), but the concept has not received much attention. Rather, there have been numerous reports of internal factional strife.
Vince Cable highlights that party officials connected to Shanghai differ from those in Beijing (or other places). The Shanghai group, which supported market reforms, and Hu Jintao’s Youth League, which had a more egalitarian stance, engaged in a semi-public dispute prior to Xi.
Can Nepal, which is among the nations participating in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), abstain from the Global Security Initiative (GSI), created under the Chinese security concept?
Under Xi, beginning with the imprisonment of his main rival for power, Bo Xilai, there has been no public dissent from official policy, although there is a cottage industry of commentators in academic think tanks in China offering carefully coded and nuanced views.
Cooperation Xi Seeks
At the National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party adopted Xi’s philosophy as “Xi Jinpingism” and made it its tenet. At the Chinese Communist Party’s Ninth National Congress, it was determined to spread “Xi Jinpingism” outside China.
Building common ground on geostrategic concerns and exchanging opinions with parties in other nations appear to be the CCP’s primary objectives. Additionally, the CCP facilitates the expansion of alliances through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious initiative launched by the Chinese president in 2013.
Nepal-China relations were described as a “good-neighborly partnership” when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Kathmandu in 1996. This was changed to a “comprehensive cooperation partnership” in 2009–2010. It was further strengthened to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” when President Xi Jinping visited Kathmandu in 2019.
In his book Himal Pari ko Huri, author Sudheer Sharma describes how China had developed a “communist partnership” with the government of KP Sharma Oli, the leader of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), which was created by integrating the Maoists. How much of this strategic alliance is non-military and how much is military?
There is significant variance in how this is understood. According to KP Oli, the goal of this strategic alliance is social and economic advancement. China had a totally different understanding and interpretation.
We must first examine China’s perspective on partnership diplomacy to understand this. Quoting one of the Chinese scholars, Sharma depicts that Hopan Quanxi, the Chinese term for partnership, has a very broad definition. An intimate and devoted friend who is prepared to assist even at the expense of his own life is referred to as a hopan (partner) in ancient Chinese military regulations.
Nepal has been fighting for democracy for about 80 years. The state, which was founded on the principles of liberal democracy, is now ruled by the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP).
Furthermore, the idea of Quanxi (relationship) is derived from Confucianism, an ancient Chinese social ideology that emphasizes the importance of establishing hierarchical connections among people in order to maintain a particular social order. For the Chinese, this means a long-term partnership that represents their strategic objectives.
Can Nepal, which is among the nations participating in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), abstain from the Global Security Initiative (GSI), created under the Chinese security concept? In this regard, the Chinese foreign minister stated at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus Summit in 2025 that Nepal supports China’s GSI, although Nepal’s support for the same was explicitly denied by the concerned delegates accompanying Oli during the visit.
In this context, while addressing a special symposium organized in Kathmandu a few days ago, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal put forward a four-point proposal to further strengthen the relationship between Nepal and China.
The proposal included linking the BRI with Nepal’s development strategy, accelerating the construction of the Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network, coordinating in forums such as the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and committing to cooperate in implementing the GSI and other Chinese initiatives proposed by President Xi Jinping.
Nepal has been fighting for democracy for about 80 years. The state, which was founded on the principles of liberal democracy, is now ruled by the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP). Senior officials of this party have repeatedly stated that the RSP rejects communist ideology. It remains to be seen how significant an impact Xi’s philosophy will have on the current administration.
Finally, I conclude this article with a statement made by Madhuraman Acharya at a conclave held in Kathmandu last month in a special context: “China wants to cooperate with us, but how it wants to present itself is more important than how we see it.”
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