Finance Minister Swarnim Wagle’s recent remark in Delhi that “the era of linking Nepali nationalism with anti-India sentiment is over” has triggered a storm back home in Nepal. I wish he had refrained from making the remark in that setting.
However, I personally believe that the controversy is less about the substance of his statement than about its venue and timing. In fact, it is merely a storm in a teacup! The uproar back home has prompted me to raise a serious analytical question: When does nationalism protect national interests, and when does it become merely a political performative exercise?
Conceptul framework
In modern political discourse, hollow or performative nationalism refers to a political strategy in which nationalist gestures are deployed primarily to secure domestic legitimacy rather than to achieve concrete external outcomes.
American political scientist Paul R. Brass, in his book Ethnicity and Nationalism (1991), and British historian John Breuilly, in Nationalism and the State (1993), provide conceptual frameworks for understanding nationalism and its distinction from purely symbolic political mobilisation.
Three characteristics are generally associated with performative nationalism:
(a) Domestic timing: It tends to intensify during periods of governance crises or declining political legitimacy.
(b) Symbolic actions: Speeches, maps, effigies and public declarations take precedence over the preparation of comprehensive dossiers, properly maintained records and substantive diplomatic initiatives.
(c) Absence of follow-through: Political declarations are rarely translated into sustained institutional, diplomatic or policy action.
Historical correction: Where it did not begin
It is analytically inaccurate to locate hollow anti-Indian nationalism in King Mahendra’s period. Mahendra’s foreign policy was based on balancing and diversification, rather than India-bashing.
Between 1960 and 1971, he pursued a classic small-state strategy of diversifying Nepal’s external relationships and economic partnerships. This included the construction of the East-West Highway with diversified foreign assistance and the establishment of institutions such as Nepal Rastra Bank, Rastriya Banijya Bank, Nepal Industrial Development Corporation, Sajha Yatayat and Salt Trading Corporation.
The development of import-substituting industries, including Birgunj Sugar Factory, Janakpur Cigarette Factory and Bansbari Leather and Shoe Factory, along with the establishment of the Balaju Industrial Estate, formed part of this broader strategy. Land reform (1964), nationalisation of forests, and the expansion of hospitals and educational institutions were also components of a deliberate effort to strengthen economic self-reliance.
His famous metaphor of Nepal as a “yam between two boulders” was essentially a structural description of the country’s geopolitical vulnerability, not a nationalist mobilisation slogan.
The performative turn began later
The performative turn began around 1979, when the Panchayat system’s legitimacy started eroding following the referendum. A section of hardline Panchas, lacking a convincing development agenda, increasingly instrumentalised anti-Indian rhetoric for political survival.
Hostile rhetoric in Kathmandu does little to influence policymaking in New Delhi’s South Block. Instead, it risks affecting Nepali and Indian workers, students and patients, who may encounter greater suspicion and social hostility.
During the 1989–90 trade and transit impasse, instead of adequately addressing issues such as warehousing, fuel reserves and customs reforms, the economic hardship was increasingly framed in terms of nationalist pride. The result was growing public alienation and the eventual collapse of the Panchayat regime in 1990.
Hollow nationalism did not save the Panchayat system; rather, it hastened its downfall. A second and more systematic phase emerged with the advent of competitive communist politics. This was the real era of institutionalised hollow anti-Indianism. After 1994, and particularly after 2008, the UML and the CPN (Maoist) increasingly adopted anti-Indian rhetoric as a relatively low-cost instrument of political legitimacy.
For political parties struggling to deliver on employment, corruption control and public service delivery, attributing domestic failures to an external hegemon proved politically convenient.
How performative politics harmed national interests
- Diplomatic freezing
The Kalapani-Lipulekh-Limpiyadhura dispute illustrates the costs of performative nationalism.
Nepal’s cartographic claim is legally and politically significant. The publication of the new political map in May 2020 was also a legitimate assertion of Nepal’s territorial position. However, the absence of sustained efforts towards bilateral negotiations in subsequent years weakened the diplomatic momentum. Although convincing India was never going to be easy, successive Nepali governments failed to demonstrate sufficiently consistent efforts to pursue negotiations through quiet, persuasive and evidence-based diplomacy.
Performative politics generated domestic political unity, but it did not produce a diplomatic breakthrough. Instead, it contributed to a prolonged stalemate.
- Economic costs
Beyond sensitive border disputes, Nepal’s major economic concerns with India extend to a range of commercial and trade-related issues.
These include the growing trade deficit and non-tariff barriers, such as FSSAI certification requirements for agricultural products, Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) requirements for industrial goods and quarantine regulations. Such issues require sustained technical engagement, specialised negotiations and institutional follow-through.
When the political environment becomes excessively nationalistic, reaching mutually beneficial agreements becomes more difficult. The August 2026 floods, when Nepal once again required Indian disaster-response aircraft—a point acknowledged by Finance Minister Wagle—exposed the contradiction between hollow nationalist rhetoric and Nepal’s structural dependence on regional cooperation.
- Human costs
Hollow anti-Indianism also functions as what American economist Albert O. Hirschman, in his 1970 book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, conceptualised as an escape from accountability. When legitimate demands for good governance are dismissed as foreign-sponsored activities, governments and political actors effectively avoid addressing the underlying grievances. Reform is postponed, while public debate is diverted towards external threats.
When Prime Minister Balen Shah visits Delhi, will he demonstrate the courage and conviction to raise Nepal’s concerns over borders, trade and energy, backed by well-documented dossiers and a clear negotiating position?
This was a familiar tactic among Panchayat hardliners in the late 1980s. A similar tendency reappeared in 2024–25, when demands led by Gen Z for employment opportunities, corruption control and quality education were dismissed in some quarters as externally funded.
The heaviest costs of hostile nationalism are ultimately borne by ordinary people on both sides of the border. More than four million Nepalis live and work in India. Similarly, many Indian workers, particularly from Bihar, come to Nepal for employment in various sectors, including manual labour.
Hostile rhetoric in Kathmandu does little to influence policymaking in New Delhi’s South Block. Instead, it risks affecting Nepali and Indian workers, students and patients, who may encounter greater suspicion and social hostility.
Conclusion
If Nepal is to move beyond performative politics, what would substantive nationalism look like? Perhaps it would resemble Mahendra’s logic of diversification, adapted to contemporary challenges: rigorous legal preparation on border issues, sustained commercial negotiations on trade and market-based solutions in the energy sector.
By legal preparation, I mean compiling historical treaties, original survey maps, land revenue records, evidence of administrative control, voter lists and census records, among other relevant documents, into a comprehensive and well-organised dossier.
None of these initiatives will produce viral video clips or generate immediate political applause. But all of them will strengthen state capacity and advance national interests.
Nepal does not lack nationalism or the courage to defend its sovereignty. From 1990 to 2006 and again in 2024, the country has demonstrated its capacity for political mobilisation and resistance. What it has lacked is a clear distinction between nationalism that merely performs and nationalism that actually delivers.
Wagle’s statement, regardless of the venue in which it was made, should perhaps be understood as an observation about growing generational fatigue with performative nationalism. Calling it an act of genuflection is itself a storm in a teacup. The real test, however, lies in substantive action.
When Prime Minister Balen Shah visits Delhi, will he demonstrate the courage and conviction to raise Nepal’s concerns over borders, trade and energy, backed by well-documented dossiers and a clear negotiating position?
Here lies the catch!
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