Interests prevail in international politics, while friendship is an important aspect of a state’s ability to succeed in great power politics, particularly with regard to reshaping or building international order.

International friendship adopts an approach in International Relations that influences the creation and conduct of foreign policy.

Friendships tend to arise along strategic or prescriptive dimensions. The most important enduring friendships are bilateral relationships, implying a significant degree of trust.

Politicians need to pay careful attention to the various ways close bonds develop and work, as in international politics there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.

Nepal, as a landlocked nation, has a quest for diversification and less dependency, which can be an explicit goal of foreign policy.

The first phase of the Cold War began with the end of World War II in 1945. It continued until 1991 until February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine.

Decision-making in concrete situations and a disposition for long-term cooperation are as important as examining their discursive, emotional, and practical expressions and their impact on established strategic endeavors.

The geopolitical dynamics of South Asia have undergone a profound transformation in recent years, marked by notable significant developments that are redefining and reshaping relationships, such as the Maldives turning away from India as China woos it with aid.

The English novelist Thomas Hardy wrote, “War makes rattling good history; but Peace is poor reading,” subtly raising the question of whether conflict and enemies marginalize the premises of peace and friendship.

But there is a blunt inconsistency between the jargon of policymakers that relinquishes substantial comprehension into the motives of states’ behavior.

There is no doubt that in International Relations, the best of friends would be your immediate neighbors with connected civilizational touch, economic cooperation, and collective progress; so it is for Nepal.

China and India are entangled in their competition with surfaced border disputes and ideological variation. Both are regional political actors and global influencers in the ongoing China-US rivalry.

With this rivalry and competition, together with Nepal, there are many nations that do not tend to take sides and gain leverage from playing great powers off each other, and the South Asian region is one of them. It is preferable to take a less clear alignment with either China or India and the US.

Global Competition

The Cold War that commenced with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and lasted until 1991 with the Sino-Soviet split in 1961 and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The analogy in Cold War 2.0 is that it is between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc with no large-scale fighting but with proxy wars.

The War in Ukraine and the War in Gaza are instances. The difference is that the global south and global north, with north-south and south-south cooperation, economy has been the greatest diplomatic tool in geopolitics.

Bringing countries to your side is important, as during the Cold War, which is ongoing in various forms like the geopolitical theory for global influence.

The central elements of China’s vision with Global Community of Shared Future (GCSF) and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) for the US and Allies.

History is too important to be left to historians. Countries lacking awareness of the past are as deprived as those who remain strangers to the world of imaginative literature.

Third is signing of seven bilateral agreements during the October 2019 visit of President Xi Jinping in Kathmandu to further connectivity, trade, economic assistance, security relationship, and strategic partnership.

Summoning the past in order to bolster some current perception or conviction develops confidence in political-diplomacy strides.

Understanding and acknowledging the phases of the Cold War is important to equate the analogy of Cold War 2.0.

The first phase of the Cold War began with the end of World War II in 1945. It continued until 1991 until February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine.

It is also argued as the post-Cold War but it is the beginning of Cold War 2.0. The containment in addition prompting policies were visible as it is now in the Indo-Pacific Region with North-South cooperation (G7 and G20), QUAD, AUKUS, Japan-Republic of Korea-USA Indo-Pacific Trilateral Dialogue, and Chip 4 Alliances.

In the other encampment; Global South or even the G77 cooperation, Russia-Sino unlimited relations, Pakistan-Sino all-weather relationship, and Sino-Russia-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Trilateral strategic Partnership.

China has dissimilar models from extensive economic engagement to political strategic autonomy for political influence.

The models tend to meet the needs of regional countries that are seeking to diversify their relationships for strategic advantage.

In South Asia, China’s relationship with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka can be examined as it has no singular diplomatic approach.

Nepal and China Diplomatic Endeavors

Nepal and China’s diplomatic engagement can usher with four endeavors.

One is the signing of the Transit and Transportation Agreement by KP Oli after the undeclared Indian border blockade in 2016 to carry out third country trade via seven Chinese ports, four sea, and three lands.

India has been part of geopolitical theories for North-South cooperation like IMEC balanced with BRICKS and SCO. What if the ‘First Neighbourhood’ policy arrives with a new geopolitical influential practice held up by democracy and the USA? Will Nepal cohere to the constitutional arrangements?

Second is signing the ‘Protocol on Implementing Agreement’ that was pending since 2016 and six other agreements by Vidya Devi Bhandari in April 2019.

Third is signing of seven bilateral agreements during the October 2019 visit of President Xi Jinping in Kathmandu to further connectivity, trade, economic assistance, security relationship, and strategic partnership.

He clearly stated, “China will assist Nepal in transforming it from a landlocked country to a land-linked country. China is also ready to open as many as trade transits with Nepal.”

Lastly, in September 2023, on the sidelines of Hangzhou Asian Games in eastern China, President Xi Jinping met Prachanda and vowed to help Nepal transform from a landlocked country to a land-linked nation facilitating infrastructure connectivity and transit transportation cooperation with Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network (THMDCN) and the Belt and Road (BRI) projects taking shape.

Nepal signed a transport-transit agreement to access seven ports in China; nine BRI projects were selected, and the THMDCN, all central elements of China’s vision and soft power diplomacy to support core interests and major concerns and consolidate the political foundation of bilateral relations.

The reaffirmation of political trust while endorsing the “One China” principles, in contrast to previous policies.

Simultaneously, influencing the neighboring countries of China and India is a strategic diplomatic endeavor.

For China, regions around the heartland and rimland are important to bring to their sides as the Soviets did in the formation of the Warsaw Pact not to let the Americans take it away from them.

The Brezhnev Doctrine ideologically arrogated the right to define socialism and communism to perform as the front-runner of the global socialist movement with a corollary impression of the necessity of intervention if a country is seen to be violating core socialist ideas and communist party function.

The geostrategic impression is that it prevented invasion by Western European powers. NATO and Warsaw, though led to the expansion of military forces and their integration into the respective blocs for 36 years never directly waged war but fought on an ideological basis.

In the contemporary geopolitical surroundings, initiatives under the GCSF and PGII are an offering and an opening for low and middle-income countries in the Global South, including Nepal, to meet their strategic needs but without being part of the bloc adhering to the Non-Alignment principles to avoid the probable flare-up of a hot war.

The largest military engagement of the Warsaw Pact besides Romania was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Strategic Trap for Nepal

Nepal’s foreign policy is driven by political parties’ momentary interests, seldom national Foreign Policy.

A small, landlocked country like Nepal could have been substantial with just inheriting judicious schemes for its strategic necessities and circumvent regional and global competition.

What if the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) expands?

India has been part of geopolitical theories for North-South cooperation like IMEC balanced with BRICKS and SCO. What if the ‘First Neighbourhood’ policy arrives with a new geopolitical influential practice held up by democracy and the USA? Will Nepal cohere to the constitutional arrangements?

Though the third block, the Non-Alignment Movement during the Cold War period feasibility is well debated in the changed geostrategic environment.

Small nations in Asia are in search of a non-binding consensus for strategic diplomatic positions. Nepal’s both immediate neighbors China and India have ambitious plans to connect the world in which China has the advantage of its economic advancement. Europeans became part of the Blocs and later in military alliance (NATO & Warsaw).

Neutrality played an important role, but shifts in interests transferred Foreign Policy like Sweden and Finland joining NATO with the beginning of Cold War 2.0.

Falling into a debt trap can be fitfully adjusted as the loan of Pokhara International Airport from Exim Bank of China could happen during Foreign Minister Narayan Kaji Shrestha’s visit to China.

Falling into a strategic trap is arduous to sidestep as diplomatic doors close and political leaders change, leaving Nepal incapacitated with a question of credibility, instability, and poverty.

Prachanda (Puspa Kamal Dahal) from the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists Centre) led coalition government will shortly come up subscribing to the Global Community of Shared Future.

The Global Development Initiative (GDI) that has backing from over 100 nations and international organizations with more than 70 countries joining the group of friends of the GDI, which will be trailed and hedged in by the second pillar, the Global Security Initiative (GSI), upholding six commitments and the third pillar, Global Civilizational Initiative (GCI) of BRI, the central elements of China’s vision put forward at the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in September 2023.

Nepal needs a coherent strategy, along with national unity and political consensus in its politico-economic-security-diplomatic endeavors underpinned by strategic national interest.

Hope the knowledge and experience of the political elites contribute to a correct strategic destiny and political adjustments accordingly so that diplomacy prevails for Nepal’s national credibility.

Conclusion

In the contemporary geopolitical surroundings, initiatives under the GCSF and PGII are an offering and an opening for low and middle-income countries in the Global South, including Nepal, to meet their strategic needs but without being part of the bloc adhering to the Non-Alignment principles to avoid the probable flare-up of a hot war.

Nepal’s strategic posture, characterized by foreign policy ambiguity and political confusion, has been a source for politicians to create appropriate choices.

The balance of threat theory of neutrality must play centrality in diplomatic maneuvering, which is united Foreign Policy and domestic development strategy with the intention to square off risk antipathy.

This will uphold a deterrence strategy for maintaining strategic autonomy.

Nepal needs a coherent strategy, along with national unity and political consensus in its politico-economic-security-diplomatic endeavors underpinned by strategic national interest.

(The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand.)