Donald Trump’s resounding victory in last week’s US presidential election should not have come as a shock to anyone.
The 45th and 47th president rode an unprecedentedly strong anti-incumbency wave that has severely punished almost every governing party around the world at the ballot box this year.
In fact, Vice President Kamala Harris was among the best performers of all “incumbents” who faced elections in rich countries this year – a testament to her disciplined campaign, Trump’s historically unpopular candidacy, and America’s world-beating economy.
Still, this wasn’t enough amid widespread voter frustration with elevated immigration levels and persistently high prices, a legacy of the global post-pandemic inflation surge.
A hyperpolarized information environment that divides America into partisan echo chambers made it all but impossible for the Harris campaign to counter these headwinds.
No party has ever retained the White House when incumbent approval is as low as it is, and when so many Americans think the country is on the wrong track. Seen in this light, Harris’s defeat was more likely than not.
Much will depend on how Europe responds. Frontline NATO countries – Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordic states – see Russian aggression as an existential threat to their national security, and will be willing to incur the significant costs of protecting Ukraine if the US bails out.
The first Republican to win the popular vote in 20 years (owing to gains with nearly every demographic group, in almost every region), Trump will take office not only with a strong mandate but also with unified control of Congress and a conservative Supreme Court majority.
He will have free rein to enact his sweeping domestic policy agenda, radically remake the federal government, and rewrite institutional norms.
But if Trump’s return will have a profound impact on the United States, it may matter even more for the rest of the world.
Many expect that US foreign policy in the second Trump administration will simply be a repeat of his first term, when there were no major wars (other than the winding down of America’s longest in Afghanistan).
Trump even scored some notable foreign-policy successes, including a revitalized North American Free Trade Agreement (now the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement), the Middle East Abraham Accords, fairer cost-sharing among NATO members, and new and stronger security alliances in Asia.
Moreover, Trump is still the same person he was four years ago, for better and worse, and his worldview remains unchanged, as does his assertively unilateralist and transactional approach to foreign policy.
But other things have changed. For starters, while the president-elect remains personally uninterested in the business of governance, his second administration will be staffed with more ideologically aligned and experienced senior officials ready to implement his “America First” agenda from the start.
Gone are the institutionalist career staffers who often checked the president’s most disruptive impulses, as well as the less seasoned loyalists who later replaced them.
Trump’s second-term foreign-policy advisers will be much more loyal than those at the start of his first term, and more experienced than those at the end of it.
Most importantly, the world has become more dangerous since he last held the job.
Trump’s first-term accomplishments took place amid historically low interest rates and within a generally benign geopolitical context.
But now, two regional wars, intensifying competition with China, emboldened rogue actors like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, a sluggish global economy, and disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence will place entirely new demands on Trump’s leadership.
The stakes are higher, and the implications of an unpredictable “America First” foreign policy are much more far-reaching, than they were in 2016. Extreme outcomes are much more likely.
Though Trump will still be able to get some foreign-policy wins through his transactional approach and the influence that comes with being president of the world’s most powerful country, the potential for things to go sideways is far greater in this environment.
For example, Trump will take a much harder line toward China, after the Biden administration managed to stabilize relations.
This will begin with a push to hike tariffs on Chinese imports to address the bilateral trade deficit.
Depending on how prohibitive Trump’s tariffs are and whether the Chinese see room to negotiate rather than retaliate, it is possible that escalation could prompt a breakthrough.
After all, China faces severe economic problems and will tread carefully to avoid unnecessary crises.
But it’s more likely that the confrontational approach favored by Trump’s hawkish cabinet and congressional Republicans will harm the relationship.
The result will be a new cold war that ultimately increases the risk of direct military confrontation.
In the Middle East, the president-elect will try to expand his signature Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia, while giving Israel a blank check to prosecute its wars, with no pressure to limit the humanitarian toll or escalation risk of its actions.
Either way, Trump’s return will usher in a period of heightened geopolitical volatility and uncertainty, marked by a greater likelihood of both catastrophic breakdowns and improbable breakthroughs.
Most concerningly, Trump will support – if not actively encourage – Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s goal of dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat once and for all, risking a broader conflagration and significant energy disruptions.
By contrast, Trump has vowed to end the war in Ukraine within “a day” – possibly before he’s even inaugurated – by unilaterally pressuring Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin to accept a ceasefire that freezes the conflict along current territorial lines, using military aid to Kyiv as leverage over both sides. Whether they will accept the terms or not is an open question.
Much will depend on how Europe responds. Frontline NATO countries – Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordic states – see Russian aggression as an existential threat to their national security, and will be willing to incur the significant costs of protecting Ukraine if the US bails out.
Others might relish the chance to cut a deal, whether for ideological reasons (as in Hungary’s case), for political reasons (Italy), or for fiscal reasons (Germany).
Trump’s second term could be the catalyst that finally unites Europe and galvanizes a stronger, more consolidated, and “strategically autonomous” security response.
Or it could reinforce existing divisions within the European Union, severely weaken the transatlantic alliance, and invite further Russian aggression.
Either way, Trump’s return will usher in a period of heightened geopolitical volatility and uncertainty, marked by a greater likelihood of both catastrophic breakdowns and improbable breakthroughs.
(Ian Bremmer, Founder and President of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, is a member of the Executive Committee of the UN High-level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence)
(Copyright: Project Syndicate)
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