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Naku La Face Off and India-China Development Diplomacy

Bhavna Singh

May 31, 2020

8 MIN READ

Naku La Face Off and India-China Development Diplomacy

The double jeopardy caused at the Naku La pass is easily a phenomenal dent in development diplomacy between China and India.

Firstly, the military scramble was hardly to be expected during the COVID-19 pandemic, and secondly, the trade beyond borders is definitely not taking off according to the arrangements reached on reopening border trade between the two neighbors a few years back.

Further degradation could be expected in the industry (besides the loss of around 10 billion) if the situation persists in the coming weeks and there is no permanent solution to the military skirmishes that take place off and on.

Therefore, one has to reflect on the nature of border trade and military culture one would inherit once the storm passes.

This has been a repetitive attempt after the incident at Pangong Tso in Ladakh in 2017 and the Doklam standoff, which lasted for 73 days.

Would one see a different kind of diplomatic architecture coming into place in Naku La or would this fast-forwarding of historical processes bring about deep-rooted technological and defense changes in these border areas? The possibilities of change are many.

Changing Military Signals 

The skirmish that took place along the border between China and India on 10 May 2020, led to 11 troops getting injured.

Though the Eastern Command spokesperson said that the matter was resolved after ‘dialogue and interaction at a local level’, the images are starkly contradictory when compared with the initial bonhomie that could be seen when the border trade was reopened in 2006 and military composites from both sides could be seen engaging in light humor as well.

At the same time, another incident of a skirmish between Chinese and Indian troops was reported at the lake Pangong Tso in Ladakh.

Around 250 soldiers were engaged in a violent clash and Chinese military helicopters were seen flying close to the border while Indian Airforce carried out sorties through its fleet of Sukhoi SU-30 fighters.

This has been a repetitive attempt after the incident at Pangong Tso in Ladakh in 2017 and the Doklam standoff, which lasted for 73 days.

De-escalation necessitates that both sides establish effective communication mechanisms and find ways to keep the military engaged in local infrastructure-building rather than proving to be a detriment in the recovery measures under such severe health emergencies.

Fortunately, given the health emergencies on both sides, the standoff did not escalate to a national level as pointed out by Qian Feng, a senior fellow at the Taihe Centre of the National Strategy Institute, at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zahao Lijian did not share details and rather tried to shift the blame on the Indian side while sticking to their narrative of upholding peace and tranquility along the border.

The Chinese specifically wanted to avoid any military displeasure given that the two countries are celebrating 70 years of establishment of diplomatic ties.

Zhao also denied that China was adopting an aggressive approach in its diplomacy as it fights off the virus, and condemned those politicizing or stigmatizing the issue in a bid to create a more.

The quick retraction from the face-off is a reminder of how the two neighbors could keep their differences aside and cooperate in case of an emergency.

Yet, development has suffered tremendously, which has instigated angst among the local people who lack a proper medium to vocalize their concerns.

New demarcations have been set up in social cohabitation and protective measures instilled, which have been extremely inconvenient as they cause restriction of movements.

De-escalation necessitates that both sides establish effective communication mechanisms and find ways to keep the military engaged in local infrastructure-building rather than proving to be a detriment in the recovery measures under such severe health emergencies.

Precedents obviously exist on both sides, where the military has been called upon to engage with civil-reconstruction activities after non-traditional threats have subsided, creating a balance in local living standards – same is the need of the hour.

Trade-Offs and Challenges

Due to the health crisis generated by the COVID-19, people in bordering regions have been brought to face with some important choices.

The first is between totalitarian surveillance and citizen empowerment as the state moves to introduce more restraining technologies.

Though this is not fully possible in bordering regions, the other challenge to balance between local resources and their construction, to national reconstruction.

According to the Association of Conservation and Tourism, the Himalayan Hospitality and Tourism Development Network, and some other associations in the region like the Bengal Zonal Council of the Confederation of Tourism Industry, there has been a compounded daily loss of Rs. 190 million in the economy of Sikkim and surrounding areas.

The biggest jolt came from the fact that the lockdown was announced when the tourism season was about to start in Sikkim.

More than a dozen rounds of talks since 2003 haven’t led to much progress due to competing views on the de-facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control.

The fact that immature and even dangerous technologies could be used during such times is threatening to the very existence of social ecosystems around the border areas.

This could be a real threat to development diplomacy which has been a cornerstone of engagement between the bordering regions of India and China.

As pointed out by Yuval Noah Harari, the transformation brought by the COVID-19 health crisis could not only shape our healthcare systems but also economy, politics and culture for years to come.

Paradoxically, as health systems and measures instilled by the state require a high amount of monitoring, and as diseases transcend geographies, the concept of borders has quickly gained traction. Disputes along the 2000-mile border have grown in the past decade as much of the border remains contested and defined.

More than a dozen rounds of talks since 2003 haven’t led to much progress due to competing views on the de-facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control.

Both sides continue to patrol their respective perceptions of the border, sometimes with transgressions. A similar skirmish is also at play along the Indo-Nepal border, with Nepal’s objections to the newly opened ‘Link Road’ which connects India to the Lipulekh as it passes through Nepalese territory.

The Indian side has tried to make it more convenient for the pilgrims to reach the Mansarovar.

What remains to be seen is how effectively the states will deal with the challenges in development diplomacy, as most of these bordering regions become prone to escalation due to lingering problems of insufficient health care, livelihood, etc. and non-accessibility to mainstream commitment.

(Bhavna Singh is a Researcher on Capital Markets and Digitization Diagnostics at McKinsey & Company).

(Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), Nepal’s independent think tank, and Khabarhub — Nepal’s popular news portal — have joined hands to disseminate NIICE research articles from Nepal)
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