Nepal has traveled a long way in political and social terms through three waves of democracy in 1951, 1990, and 2006; it had seven constitutions in seven decades between 1948 and 2015. The latest turning point in its history was the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006 that ended the decade-long Maoist conflict and subsequently abolished the Hindu monarchy through the elected Constituent Assembly in 2008.

Such historic changes give an opportunity to assess the utility and validity of formal institutions and the necessity of participatory culture to further ensure the representative functions. One point deserves to be mentioned here. There are fundamentally divergent perspectives as to whether lessons of postcolonial transition learned in a country may successfully be applied in another. If a reasonably democratic country may keep the potential saboteurs away in the long run, to borrow Wright, there are reasons to believe that the present freedom of expression and organization is a good way for governing and Nepali people may cherish how well their communities are working democratically in practice, although the control over relevant cultural, structural, and contextual factors may be without precedent.

Nevertheless, Nepal’s road to peace has been a topsy-turvy path marred by political instability reflecting what Dahl describes as ‘democratic paradox’ where citizens have low faith in democratic institutions but high esteem for democratic ideals.

We do not like to believe that Nepal is a failed state, or it is on the verge of collapsing and characteristically losing the ability to govern, or to provide physical security for its citizens, or to control its territory and ungoverned space, or it is drifting from public discussion and electoral politics; for that is not simply the case. But, Nepal has been unable at times to consolidate and sustain democracy installed and it is believed that prolonged political instability harms economic growth and development.

As it turns out, Nepal is a democratic state with unresolved issues which may be more problematic in the long run. We may also say that it is not yet able to enforce all sorts of decisions and policy matters. The link between the state and interest groups in civil society is very weak. There is a bureaucracy which is too large to be controlled and so, ineffective in practice; corruption in the state and amongst its officials is rampant.

The state-society cooperation is lacking; so is social control. That is why they have failed constructing an effective, legitimate, and responsive state to provide an adequate context to achieve a representative and pluralistic system of governance and flourish, calling for effective capacity of institutions that are needed for institutionalization of democracy to the extent that the ‘citizens positively perceive the actions of government and its policies as being close to their performances.’

Nepal has failed to adequately promote and strengthen the institutions of democracy and overcome the problems of class, ethnicity, regional and gender discriminations in addition to the economic disparity largely due to weird but frequent manipulations by political mafia.

An undeniably intriguing riddle is the recurring disagreements to address the key issues among the dominant forces. This induces one to visualize vulnerability toward two different threats. First, there is a danger of authoritarianism revisiting, albeit with a nominal make-up of democracy to get verbal accolades — a situation without substantive democratic changes and a generic phenomenon of transition that may adopt Bonaparte’s path.

Second is the roller-coaster deadly form of a conflict-prone corrupt state. Nepal’s current instability is linked to a number of causes, both internal and external. Placed geo-strategically between India and China, Nepal’s omnidirectional foreign policy may not be compatible to serve peace, prosperity, and people’s code which is democracy all about. This would be an important inquiry for research.

In fact, Nepal had experienced democratic transformation from the authoritarian monarchy in 1990 whereas the ‘Third Wave’ (1991) of Huntington had started in 1974-75. Yet, it is tasteless for the politicians to play the rules of the game even for the basic functioning of democracy, let alone consolidating it, which sometimes is on the reverse path.

Their unending greed and notorious politicking remain a formidable impediment to improving opportunities for all social groups in line with the civic and political liberties guaranteed in the constitution. Nepal is also not on the right track yet in terms of the quality of elections; it is lacking the institutional process required for a fair and free electoral competition. It is what Mainwaring and Scully would like to call an ‘inchoate party system’ which is predominantly driven by personalities instead of being consolidated by ideologies, even if the demagogues keep claiming their priorities for socialism, communism, and democracy at the same time.

A state in which the enterprises lack vigor and leadership can hardly play its needed role to enhance democratic legitimacy and it may not be adequately adaptive. I cannot say definitely whether Nepal’s volatile politics will yield good results; however, as a political observer and citizen, I must admit that the roles of the government and the parties are severely limited and the political leadership is largely reactive rather than proactive. The reason is very clear.

As I have pointed out elsewhere in this presentation, we may preserve democracy only by limiting our political ambitions; we need more effective governance in place of what is widely practiced. Although discussion about the quality of democracy is ‘typically understood as different from the degree of democracy, what is required in Nepal is to actively raise public awareness.

The current problems of Nepal are often interpreted in terms of public order and institutional settings to formulate policies and actions to deal with the new reality and the ability to accumulate social capital for more effective governance besides systematic debates over specific choices. Due to the long-term historical factors of culture, politics, and economy, there must be sincere efforts to encourage inclusion of citizens in decision-making schematically and initiate meaningful political reforms to enhance the quality of democracy, rule of law, a closely bonded dyad,  and good governance—essential for what Plato in his Republic regarded  as an ‘ideal state’.

(To be continued)